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NOTE
Using RICO To Fight Environmental Crime: The
Case for Listing Violations of RCRA as Predicate
Offenses for RICO
I. INTRODUCTION
Since the 1970s, we, as a nation, have learned to appreciate
the fragile balance of the ecosystem in which we live.' To protect
it, our government has increasingly turned to criminal sanctions
based upon the idea that crimes against the environment are
crimes against the people. As former United States Attorney Gen-
eral Richard Thornburgh said to the National Association of Dis-
trict Attorneys in Portland, Maine on July 19, 1989: "The concept
of 'the environment as a Crime Victim' puts the issue of pollution
in its proper context. It says that we believe as a nation and as
prosecutors that a polluter is a criminal who has violated the
rights and the sanctity of a living thing-the largest living organ-
ism in the known universe-the earth's environment."2
As part of a "government-wide trend towards adopting,
strengthening, and vigorously enforcing criminal provisions to
protect the environment,"' Congress has added criminal sanctions
to most of the major environmental statutes. Yet pollution contin-
ues, largely because the costs of continual compliance outweigh
the risks of being caught polluting, and because the statutes rely
heavily on the potential violators to audit and report themselves
1 In a 1984 Department of Justice poll of 60,000 people, environmental crime
ranked ahead of heroin smuggling, bank robbery, attempted murder, arson and vehicular
homicide. Anthony J. Celebrezze, Jr. et al., Criminal Enforcement of State Environmental Laws:
The Ohio Solution, 14 HARv. ENvrt. L. REv. 217, 217-18 (1990). The Department defined
environmental crime by three examples: "(1) a factory knowingly gets rid of its waste in
a way that pollutes the water supply of a city. As a result, 20 people die, (2) a factory
knowingly gets rid of its waste in a way that pollutes the water supply of a city. As a
result, one person dies, and (3) a factory knowingly gets rid of its waste in a way that
pollutes the water supply of a city. As a result, 20 people become ill but none requires
medical treatment." Id. at n.2.
2 R. Christopher Locke, Environmental Crimes: The Absence of 'Intent' and the Complexi-
ties of Compliance, 16 COLUM. J. ENVTL. L 311, 313 (1991).
3 Stephen J. Darmody, The Oil Pollution Act's Criminal Penalties: On a Collision Course
With the Law of the Sea, 21 B.C. ENVrL ArF. L. REV. 89, 116 (1993).
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for violating the laws. Additionally, prosecutions are complicated
by the difficulty in joining diverse defendants and varied, often
unrelated acts, which together result in pollution.
In response, the government has begun prosecuting polluters
for mail and wire fraud under the Racketeering Influenced and
Corrupt Organizations Act (RICO). Increased criminal penalties,
longer statutes of limitations and greater ability to join defendants
and offenses have proven useful tools in charging and convicting
polluters. Yet relying on mail and wire fraud is risky because (1)
the violators may not have committed fraud, and (2) some courts
disagree whether defrauding a governmental agency in order to
receive a permit comes under the mail and wire fraud statutes.
Furthermore, prosecuting environmental violations, not fraud, is
the government's aim. Why not avoid the peripheral fraud charges
altogether and use RICO to prosecute polluters directly for the
environmental violations?
In order to accomplish this, Congress must include violations
of the environmental statutes as racketeering activities under RI-
CO. Specifically, Congress should add violations of the Resource
Conservation and Recovery Act (RCRA)-under which most envi-
ronmental, criminal prosecutions using RICO's mail and wire
fraud provisions have been brought-and of comparable state
statutes as predicate offenses under RICO.
In Part II, this Note examines the historical development of
the criminalization of environmental law, including a description
of the felony criminal provisions in the major federal environmen-
tal statutes. Part II also discusses traditional criminal statutes used
in conjunction with the environmental statutes before focusing on
RICO and its underlying policies. As part of its RICO analysis, this
Note tracks the use of mail and wire fraud counts to prosecute
environmental violators under federal and state racketeering stat-
utes.
In Part III, this Note compares the disadvantages of prosecut-
ing solely under the environmental statutes with the advantages of
using RICO. In its environmental statutes subsection, Part III fo-
cuses on the problems of relying on potential polluters to police
themselves and on the difficulty in prosecuting increasingly com-
plex environmental violations within the constraints of the federal
criminal rules regarding joinder of defendants and of offenses. In
the RICO subsection, this Note looks at the deterrent value of
RICO's more stringent criminal penalties and at the benefits to
the prosecution of RICO's longer statute of limitations and greater
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flexibility in joining parties and counts.
In Part IV, this Note arges that listing violations of RCRA and
of comparable state statutes as predicate offenses under RICO is
the most effective method of preventing and prosecuting environ-
mental crimes.
II. INCREASING CRIMINALIZATION OF ENVIRONMENTAL LAW
A. Growing Public Concern with Environmental Violations
While federal environmental protection dates as far back as
the Federal Rivers and Harbors Appropriations Act of 1899,' nei-
ther the public nor the government were overly concerned with
environmental crimes in general or with the illegal disposal of
hazardous waste in particular before the 1970s.'
In 1972, Congress passed the Federal Water Pollution Control
Act (FWPCA), which contained misdemeanor penalties for negli-
gent and willful violations.' In June 1976, the Environmental Pro-
tection Agency (EPA) initiated a Draft Criminal Enforcement Strat-
egy and in 1977 Congress enacted the compliance deadlines in
the Clean Air and Water Acts.
7
The demand for criminal prosecution of polluters crystallized
in 1978 in Love Canal, New York. The Love Canal disaster cap-
tured the nation's attention when hazardous waste forced 263
families to leave their homes along the New York canal. The pub-
lic was outraged and Congress began criticizing the EPA's han-
dling of improper disposal of hazardous waste.'
4 Jed S. Rakoff et al., Civil and Criminal Enforcement of Federal Environmental Laws:
Basic Provisions and Current Controversies, at 215 (PLI Litig. & Admin. Practice Course
Handbook Series No. 474, 1993). Federal prosecutors discovered the Refuse Act, 33
U.S.C. §407 (1988) (§ 13 of the Rivers and Harbors Appropriation Act of 1899), in 1970
and combined it with the investigatory powers of the grand jury to attack industrial water
pollution. The Refuse Act once again retreated to the history books when Congress
passed the Federal Water Pollution Act Amendments of 1972. Pub. L. No. 92-500, 86
Stat. 816 (1972). See Daniel Riesel, Criminal Prosecution and Defense of Environmental Wrongs,
15 ENVrL L REP. 10,065, 10,066 (March, 1985).
5 DONALD J. REBOVICH, DANGEROUS GROUND: THE WORLD OF HAZARDOUS WASTE
CRIME 4 (1992).
6 Judson W. Starr, Turbulent Times at Justice and EPA: The Origins of Environmental
Criminal Prosecutions and the Work that Remains, 59 GEO. WASH. L REv. 900, 903 (1991).
7 Celebrezze, supra note 1, at 219-20.
8 REBoviCH, supra note 5, at 4. The criticism of the EPA reached a crescendo when
the agency's administrator, Anne Burford, announced in February 1983 that the govern-
ment had bought an entire town for $36.7 million. A waste hauler spraying oil on streets
to eliminate dust had contaminated Times Beach, Missouri to such an extent that the
government relocated the 2,500 residents and bought most of the businesses and homes.
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James Moorman, then-Assistant Attorney General for the
Lands Division of the Department of Justice (DOJ) echoed the
growing public demand for a crack-down on polluters by stating
that the DOJ would prosecute "willful, substantive violations of the
pollution control laws of the criminal nature."9 In 1979, Moorman
told the Senate Subcommittee on Environmental Pollution that
the government would no longer focus solely on civil and adminis-
trative efforts to encourage compliance. Instead it would use crimi-
nal sanctions against individuals and corporations to prevent pollu-
tion:
Now, however, I believe we stand on the threshold of a signifi-
cant change in the nature of environmental enforcement litiga-
tion. We must move, particularly in the field of toxics and
hazardous waste, to a different type of case. These cases will
require a substantial improvement in EPA's investigative capa-
bility. EPA must improve its ability to audit the pollution con-
trol operations of plants; the ability to obtain and analyze sam-
ples of many toxic pollutants; and the ability to track down
and identify surreptitious discharges."
Congress passed the Resource Conservation and Recovery Act
(RCRA) in 1976 to track hazardous waste "from cradle to grave"
and the Comprehensive Environmental Response, Compensation
and Recovery Act (CERCLA) in 1980 to clean up many of the
hazardous waste dumping sites. Both contained criminal provi-
sions." Also in 1980, the DOJ created a separate Environmental
Enforcement Section. Although primarily enforcing civil sanctions,
the government now intended to increase the number of criminal
Id. at 5-6.
Later that month, the government awarded a $7.7 million cleanup contract to
Chemical Waste Management Inc. despite the fact that one month earlier, the EPA had
charged it with covering up pollution violations. James W. Sanderson, Burford's former
consultant, had represented Chemical Waste in its dealings with the government. Id. at 6.
As a result of the scandal, Rita M. Lavelle, head of EPA's hazardous waste cleanup
program, and several other top officials were fired. Burford resigned in March. Lavelle
was indicted on five felony counts in August. A year later, the House Energy and Com-
merce Committee's Oversight and Investigations Subcommittee charged that Burford and
Lavelle had "purposely limited expenditures to clean up abandoned waste sites to dis-
suade congressional extension of the cleanup program." Id. at 7.
9 Starr, supra note 6, at 903.
10 Id. (quoting statement of James W. Moorman, Assistant Attorney General, Lands
Division, DOJ, from Enforcement of Environmental Regulations, 1979: Hearings Bfore the Sub-
committee on Environmental Pollution of the Senate Committee on Environmental land Public Wo*s,
96th Cong., 1st Sess. 339 (1979)).
11 REBOVICH, supra note 5, at 4-5.
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prosecutions of "'egregious violations"' and "'deliberate or recalci-
trant violations."".2 While the criminal division was responsible for
violations of Title 18, such as false statements, conspiracy and mail
and wire fraud, the Lands Division pursued violations of environ-
mental regulations. 3 And in 1981, the EPA developed its own
Office of Criminal Enforcement. 4
Prior to the Office of Criminal Enforcement, various EPA
offices throughout the country handled criminal environmental
investigations. Only the National Enforcement Investigation Center
(NEIC) in Denver, Colorado and the EPA Region III office in
Philadelphia, Pennsylvania had "developed a limited investigative
capability in the area." 5 Yet problems persisted as the EPA at-
tempted to establish centralized authority. Regional offices resist-
ed 6 and bureaucratic bickering and turf wars threatened to poi-
son relations between the EPA, the DOJ and the Federal Bureau
of Investigation (FBI).
Because the EPA was used to dealing with the DOJ's Lands
Division and because the Criminal Division represented other
governmental agencies, the EPA "did not perceive the Criminal
Division as either an ally or an aggressive prosecutor,"" and re-
sisted the DOJ's invasion of its environmental turf. However, a
district court's stinging rebuke of one of its staff attorneys, whose
mistakes had tainted the grand jury to the extent that the Fifth
Amendment's Due Process Clause required dismissal, "taught EPA
an unforgettable lesson about the seriousness and delicacy of crim-
inal cases. Ever-sensitive to criticism about its role, EPA drew back,
and from that point forward looked to DOJ to assume the leader-
ship role in the environmental criminal program."'"
12 Starr, supra note 6, at 904.
13 Id. at 905.
14 Celebrezze, supra note 1, at 220.
15 Robert W. Adler & Charles Lord, Environmental Crimes: Raising the Stakes, 59 GEO.
WASH. L. REv. 781, 792 (1991). In 1991, EPA Headquarters regained control of its crimi-
nal investigators. The NEIC in Denver had overseen the investigations since 1983. Starr,
supra note 6, at 915 n.41.
16 Starr, supra note 6, at 908.
17 Id. at 905.
18 Id. at 906 (citing United States v. Gold, 470 F. Supp. 1336 (N.D. Ill. 1979)). In
Gold, the District Court for the Northern District of Illinois found a "totality of grand
jury abuse by government attorneys, circumstances of prosecutor conduct that under-
mined the grand jury, destroyed its independence, and deprived defendants of their Fifth
Amendment rights." Gold, 470 F. Supp. at 1356. Specifically, the prosecuting attorney, an
EPA staff lawyer, testified as a witness and then remained in the grand jury room to in-
terrogate another witness, withheld exculpatory information from the grand jury, and
1995]
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At the outset, because the EPA did not know how to develop
a criminal case, it often referred cases to the DOJ before complet-
ing the necessary investigative work. The DOJ accordingly refused
about sixty percent of the referrals between 1979 and 1981.19 In
addition, investigations and prosecutions under the complex envi-
ronmental regulations took a lot of time and effort. Many United
States Attorneys felt the effort was not worth the resulting misde-
meanor penalties.2
In mid-1981, the EPA and the FBI signed a memorandum of
understanding under which the FBI agreed to investigate thirty
hazardous cases referred to it by the EPA each year. Yet neither
side lived up to the agreement. Despite now being able to pursue
felonies under the recently amended RCRA,21 the FBI "had little
interest" in investigating pursuant to the other environmental
statutes which only included misdemeanor penalties.2 The EPA
also feared that giving the FBI too large a role in investigating
environmental crimes would delay or stop authorization for its
own investigators.3
During the summer of 1982, the EPA's need for centralized
control prevailed over the regional offices' desire for greater inde-
pendence and the agency chose sixteen criminal investigators,
raising its total to twenty-three.24 After reorganizing in 1983, the
EPA assigned thirty-five investigators to the NEIC and placed the
legal staff under the direction of the Assistant Enforcement Coun-
destroyed discoverable documents. Id. at 1351-55.
19 Starr, supra note 6, at 907.
20 Id.
21 Id. at 915 n.37. The Hazardous and Solid Waste Amendments of 1984 made
RCRA the first environmental law containing felony provisions. Pub. L. No. 948-616 §
232, 948 Stat. 3221, 3256-57 (codified as amended at 42 U.S.C. §§ 6928(d)-(e) (1988)).
In 1986, the Superfund Amendments and Reauthorization Act, Pub. L. No. 99-499, § 109,
100 Stat. 1613, 1632-33 (codifed as amended at 42 U.S.C. §§ 9603(b), (d) (1988)) and
the Emergency Planning and Community Right-to-Know Act, Pub. L. No. 99-497, § 325,
100 Stat. 1728, 1753 (codified at 42 U.S.C. § 11,045(b)(4) (1988)) added felony provi-
sions to CERCLA. The Act of Nov. 15, 1990, Pub. L. No. 101-549, § 701, 1991
U.S.C.C.A.N. (104 Stat.) 2675, amended § 113 of the Clean Air Act, adding felony viola-
tions. And the Water Quality Act of 1987, Pub. L. No. 100-4, § 312, 101 Stat. 7, 42-44
(codified at 42 U.S.C. § 1319(c) (1988)), added felony provisions to the FWPCA. The
Toxic Substances Control Act (TSCA), and the Federal Insecticide, Fungicide and Roden-
ticide Act (FIFRA) are the only major environmental statutes without felony provisions.
Starr, supra note 6, at 915 n.37.





sel for Criminal Enforcement.25
While criminal environmental prosecutions began to rise,26
the EPA's troubles continued throughout the 1980s. According to
a 1989 report by an EPA inspector, the Agency restricted its em-
ployees from investigating cleanup sites. It instead told them to
use information from state agencies or from consultants of the
potentially responsible companies. The investigators even had to
practice inspecting in order to retain their investigative skillsY
In addition, the DOJ opposed giving EPA investigators full
police power, "including authority to make arrests, execute crimi-
nal search warrants, and carry firearms."28 EPA investigators had
to ask law enforcement agencies to perform these duties. Frustrat-
ed by being "relegated to second-class status in the law enforce-
ment community,"' in July 1983, the EPA asked the DOJ to dep-
utize its investigators as Special Deputy United States Marshals.
The DOJ instead offered to deputize half of the EPA's investiga-
tors. The EPA refused and both agencies testified before the
House Subcommittee on Oversight and Investigations of the Com-
mittee on Energy and Commerce. The Office of Management and
Budget subsequently issued guidelines for giving police powers to
EPA's investigators, requiring the agency to "show additional justifi-
cation before its investigators could receive the full breadth of
enforcement authority."" In April 1984, the DOJ deputized the
EPA's investigators for a trial period, which lasted about four
years. Finally, in 1988, Congress passed the Medical Waste Track-
ing Act which gave the EPA criminal investigators the full police
powers they had been requesting for the past six years."
While the criminalization of environmental law has at times
25 Adler, supra note 15, at 792.
26 Id. From 1982, when the Justice Department created its Environmental Crimes
Unit, to 1990, the department secured 703 indictments, 517 convictions, $56,074,616 in
fines, restitution, and forfeitures, and 316 years of jail time. Dick Thornburgh, Criminal
Enforcement of Environmental Laws: A National 1iority, 59 GEO. WASH. L REV. 775, 778-79
(1991). The numbers have continued to increase throughout that span, with 234 indict-
ments being returned and more than $43 million levied in fines, restitution and forfei-
tures from 1988 to 1990. Id. at 778 n.19.
27 REBOVICH, supra note 5, at 8.
28 Starr, supra note 6, at 911-12 (quoting Letter from Courtney M. Price, Special
Counsel to the Administrator for Enforcement, EPA, to Carol E. Dinkins, Assistant Attor-
ney General, Lands Division, DOJ (July 7, 1983)).
29 Id. at 911.
30 Id. at 912.
31 Id.
19951
NOTRE DAME LAW REVIEW
been a struggle, it is proceeding nonetheless. Virtually all major
environmental statutes now have criminal provisions, most includ-
ing felony violations. The following is a list and brief description
of the major environmental statutes with felony criminal provi-
sions.
B. Major Federal Environmental Statutes With Felony Criminal
Provisions
1. Resource Conservation and Recovery Act (RCRA)
RCRW2 has been dubbed "mind-numbing" for its complexi-
ty." Enacted in 1976, RCRA actually is a series of amendments to
the Solid Waste Disposal Act. 4 RCRA regulates the generation,
treatment, storage, transportation and disposal of all wastes, in-
cluding hazardous wastes."
Under RCRA, anyone (1) knowingly transporting hazardous
waste to a facility which does not have a permit, 6 or (2) know-
ingly treating, storing, or disposing of hazardous waste either with-
out a permit or in knowing violation of the permit or other appli-
cable regulations, 37 commits a felony and shall be fined up to
$50,000 per day of violation and possibly imprisoned up to five
years.' Anyone (1) knowingly omitting material information or
making a false statement," or (2) knowingly generating, storing,
treating, transporting, disposing of, exporting of, or otherwise han-
dling hazardous waste or used oil without filing the appropriate
documentation,4" also commits a felony and shall be fined up to
$50,000 per day of violation and possibly imprisoned for up to two
years.4"
32 Pub. L. No. 94-580, 90 Stat. 2795 (codified as amended at 42 U.S.C. §§
6901-6992) (1988 & Supp. V 1993).
33 Sharzad Heyat et al., Ninth Survey of White Collar Crime, 31 AM. CRIM. L. REv. 475,
494 (1994).
34 Kenneth M. Mack, Individual and Criminal Liability Under Environmental Laws, at
289, (PLI Litig. & Admin. Practice Course Handbook Series No. 459, 1993). RCRA has
also been amended by the Hazardous and Solid Waste Amendments (HSWA), Pub. L.
No. 98-616, 98 Stat. 3256 (1984) and the Superfund Amendment and Reauthorization Act
(SARA), Pub. L. No. 99-499, 100 Stat. 1703 (1986). Id.
35 Heyat, supra note 33, at 494.
36 42 U.S.C. § 6928(d)(1) (1988).
37 Id. § 6928(d) (2).
38 Id. § 6928(d)(6).
39 Id. § 6928(d) (3).
40 Id. § 6928(d) (4).
41 Id. § 6928(d)(6).
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Any person committing any of the above-mentioned violations,
knowing that it endangers someone, may be fined up to $250,000
and possibly imprisoned up to fifteen years. An organization com-
mitting such a violation may be fined up to one million dollars. 2
The government does not have to show that the defendant knew
the activity in question violated RCRA.4 Specifically, the govern-
ment does not have to prove that the alleged violator knew of the
permit requirement."' It must show that the defendant was aware
of the conduct and of the existing circumstances, or believed that
the behavior was substantially certain to endanger someone." Yet
the person is accountable "only for actual awareness or actual be-
lief that he possessed."46 Knowledge will not be attributed from
one person to another."' However, "[i]gnorance of the law is no
defense" under RCRA."
A defendant may escape liability by showing by a preponder-
ance of the evidence that the endangered person consented and
that the "danger and conduct were reasonably foreseeable hazards
of (A) an occupation, a business, or a profession; or (B) medical
treatment or medical scientific experimentation conducted by
professionally approved methods and such other person had been
made aware of the risks involved prior to giving consent."49
Congress has amended RCRA by enacting, in 1980, the Solid
Waste Disposal Act5 and the Used Oil Recycling Act,"1 and, in
1984, the Hazardous and Solid Waste Amendments"
42 Id. § 6928(e).
43 United States v. Baytank, 934 F.2d 599, 613 (5th Cir. 1991); United States v. Dee,
912 F.2d 741, 745 (4th Cir. 1990), cert. denied, 499 U.S. 919 (1991).
44 United States v. Dean, 969 F.2d 187, 190 (6th Cir. 1992); United States v. Hoflin,
880 F.2d 1033, 1038 (9th Ci-. 1989), cert denied, 493 U.S. 1083 (1990); United States v.
Laughlin, 768 F. Supp. 957 (N.D.N.Y. 1991).
45 42 U.S.C. § 6928(f)(1) (1988). The government must show that the defendant
"knew the material was hazardous in that it had the potential to be harmful to persons
or the envioronment." United States v. Self, 2 F.3d 1071, 1091 (10th Cir. 1993); Baytank,
934 F.2d at 613; Dee, 912 F.2d at 745; Hoflin, 880 F.2d at 1039. However, it does not
have to prove that the defendant knew that kCRA listed the material as hazardous waste.
Self, 2 F.3d at 1091; Baytank, 934 F.2d at 612; Dee, 912 F.2d at 745.
46 42 U.S.C. § 6928(f)(2)(A) (1988).
47 Id. § 6928(f)(2)(B).
48 United States v. Dee, 912 F.2d 741, 745 (4th Cir. 1990), cert. denied, 499 U.S. 919
(1991).
49 42 U.S.C. § 6928(f)(3) (1988).
50 Pub. L No. 96-482, 94 Stat. 2334 (1980).
51 Pub. L No. 96-463, 94 Stat. 2055 (1980).
52 Pub. L No. 98-616, 98 Stat. 3221 (1984).
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2. Comprehensive Environmental Response, Compensation and
Recovery Act (CERCLA)
Congress enacted CERCLA,53 or Superfund, in 1980 to "initi-
ate and establish a comprehensive response and financing mecha-
nism to abate and control the vast problems associated with aban-
doned and inactive hazardous waste disposal sites." '4 In so doing,
Congress provided for strict, joint and several liability55 for all
responsible parties: (1) current owners and operators, (2) owners
and operators of the facility when the hazardous waste was dis-
posed, (3) waste generators, and (4) waste transporters. 6 Liability
under CERCLA is expansive. 7 Courts have construed "owners
and operators" to include "entities and individuals exerting sub-
stantial control over the management and/or operations of a
point source, even when the entity or individual does not have an
actual ownership interest."58 Responsible parties are liable even
when they did not know of the hazardous waste disposal. 9 Parties
may escape liability only if an act of God, an act of war, or a third
party's unforeseeable act or omission caused the violation.'
In 1986, Congress amended CERCLA, upgrading its criminal
penalties from misdemeanors to felonies. Anyone in charge of a
vessel or facility from which hazardous substances are released
53 Pub. L No. 96-510, 94 Stat.. 2767 (1980) (codified as amended at 42 U.S.C §§
9601-9674 (1988 & Supp. V 1993)).
54 Heyat, supra note 33, at 518 (quoting H.R. Rep. No. 1016, 96th Cong. 2d Sess.
22 (1980), reprinted in 1980 U.S.C.C.A.N. 6119, 6125).
55 42 U.S.C. § 9607 (1988).
56 Id. § 9607(a).
57 United States v. Reilly Tar & Chem. Corp., 546 F. Supp. 1100, 1112 (D. Minn.
1982).
58 Heyat, supra note 33, at 520-21 (construing 42 U.S.C. § 9601(20) (1988)).
59 Heyat, supra note 33, at 522 (citing United States v. Aceto Agric. Chems. Corp.,
872 F.2d 1373 (8th Cir. 1989) (manufacturer of hazardous substance liable for third party
disposal regardless of lack of control over third party because manufacturer retained
ownership of hazardous substance and accrued certain benefits from third party's dispos-
al); United States v. Monsanto Co., 858 F.2d 160 (4th Cir. 1988) (liability extends to
owners of waste facilities regardless of their degree of participation subsequent to disposal
of hazardous waste), cert denied, 490 U.S. 1106 (1989); Washington v. Time Oil Co., 687
F. Supp. 529, 533 (W.D. Wash. 1988) (denying "innocent landowner" defense in response
recovery suit)). However, Heyatt cites Chemical Waste Management Inc. v. Armstrong
World Indus., 669 F. Supp. 1285, 1291 (E.D. Pa. 1987), to demonstrate that current own-
ers liable under CERCLA may recover clean-up costs from generators and former owners.
60 42 U.S.C. §9607(b) (1988).
61 Superftsnd Amendments and Reauthorization Act of 1986, Pub. L. No. 99-499, 100
Stat. 1613, at 1632-33 (codified as amended at 42 U.S.C. § 9603(b) (1988)).
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without a federal permit who does not notify the appropriate
agency as soon as he or she has knowledge of the release or who
submits false or misleading information to the agency shall be
fined pursuant to Title 18 and possibly imprisoned for three years.
If the person has already been convicted of Violating CERCLA, the
prison term could increase to five years.62 The statute contains
the same punishment for destroying records. 63 Fines may amount
to $250,000 for individuals and $500,000 for organizations for
violations of CERCLA.'
"Knowledge" in CERCLA is defined as "knowingly" is in
RCRA. The government does not have to prove that the defen-
dants knew they were violating CERCLA or that CERCLA even ex-
isted, only that they knew that they .were "doing the statutorily
prescribed acts."'
3. Federal Water Pollution Control Act (The Clean Water Act)
Congress enacted the Federal Water Pollution Control Act in
1948.' In 1972, Congress passed the Federal Water Pollution
Control Act Amendments, 67 which have become known as the
Clean Water Act (CWA) . Congress passed the CWA to "restore
and maintain the chemical, physical, and biological integrity of the
Nation's waters."' Yet the statute contained only misdemeanor
provisions until 1987 when Congress elevated violations to felo-
nies.70
Under CWA, anyone who negligently or knowingly violates any
permit condition or limitation or any pre-treatment program's
requirements is subject to a fine and possibly imprisonment. Simi-
larly, anyone who negligently or knowingly "introduces into a
sewer system or into a publicly owned treatment works any pollut-
ant or hazardous substance which such person knew or reasonably
62 42 U.S.C. § 9603(b).
63 Id. § 9603(d).
64 Id. § 9612(b)(1).
65 United States v. Buckley, 934 F.2d 94, 88 (6th Cir. 1991).
66 Pub. L No. 80-845, 62 Stat. 1155.
67 Pub. L. No. 91-604, sec. 4(a), § 113(c), 94 Stat. 1676, 1686 (1972) (codified as
amended at 42 U.S.C. § 7413(c) (Supp. V 1993)).
68 Thomburgh, supra note 26, at 776 n.3.
69 33 U.S.C. § 1251(a) (1988).
70 Thornburgh, supra note 26, at 776 n.3 (citing Water Quality Act of 1987, Pub. L.
No. 100-4, § 312, 101 Stat. 7, 42-45 (codified at 33 U.S.C. § 1319(c) (1988 & Supp. V
1993))).
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could have known could cause personal injury or property dam-
age, or ... which causes such treatment works to violate any efflu-
ent limitation or condition in any permit" violates the CWA.7'
Negligent violations are misdemeanors and carry fines ranging
from $2,500 to $25,000 per day of violation and a possible prison
term of one year.7' A knowing violator commits a felony and may
be fined between $5,000 and $50,000 per day of violation and
possibly imprisoned for three years. Knowingly submitting false,
material information or tampering with a monitoring device is
punishable by up to a $10,000 fine and up to two years in pris-
on.7 Subsequent convictions may double the fines and prison
time.74
The statute contains increased penalties for knowing endan-
germent, with up to $250,000 in fines and 15 years and up to one
million dollars with no prison time for organizations. 5 Under this
provision, individuals are accountable only for "actual awareness or
actual belief. . possessed."76 Knowledge will not be imputed to
the defendant.7  However, as in the previous two statutes, the
government need not prove that the alleged violators were aware
of the CWA's requirements or even its existence,78 only that they
knew of their actions and possessed "actual awareness" or "actual
belief' that their actions were placing someone in imminent dan-
ger.79
The defendant may avoid prosecution by showing by a pre-
ponderance of the evidence that the endangered person consent-
ed to the conduct in question and "that the danger and conduct
were reasonably foreseeable hazards of (I) an occupation, a busi-
ness, or a profession; or (II) medical treatment or medical or
scientific experimentation conducted by professionally approved
methods and such other person had been aware of the risks in-
71 33 U.S.C. § 1319(c).
72 Id. § 1319(c)(1).
73 33 U.S.C. § 1319(c)(4) (1988).
74 33 U.S.C. § 1319(c)(2), 1319(4)(1988 & Supp. V 1993).
75 Id. § 1319(c)(3).
76 33 U.S.C. § 1319(c)(3)(B)(i)(I) (1988).
77 Id. § 1319(c)(3)(B)(i)(II).
78 United States v. Weitzenhoff, I F.3d 1523, 1529-30 (9th Cir. 1993), amended and
superseded on other grounds on denial of reh'g en banc by 35 F.3d 1275 (9th Cir. 1993); Unit-
ed States v. Villegas, 784 F. Supp. 6, 11 (E.D.N.Y. 1991), affid in part and rev'd in part on
other grounds by United States v. Plaza Health Lab., Inc., 3 F.3d 643 (2d Cir. 1993), cert.
denied, United States v. Villegas, 114 S. Ct. 2764 (1994).
79 Villegas, 784 F. Supp. at 11.
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volved prior to giving consent.""
The CWA distinguishes between certain types of discharges,
banning discharges of radiological, chemical or biological warfare
agents, high-level radioactive wastes and medical wastes." The
statute prohibits discharging oil8 2 and hazardous substances"3 in-
to navigable waters "in such quantities as may be harmful."I The
CWA also authorizes the EPA to look for violations, rather than
wait for violators to report themselves. The EPA may enter premis-
es subject to the statute without a warrant, examine and copy any
required records, monitor required equipment, and take sam-
ples.'
4. Clean Air Act (CAA)
Enacted in 1967 to "protect and enhance the quality of the
Nation's air resources, so as to promote the public health and
welfare, and the productive capacity of its population,"86 the CAA
controls air pollution by requiring the EPA administrator to set
national ambient air quality standards,87 enforced through state
or federal implementation plans.'
The CAA imposes criminal liability for knowingly violating an
implementation plan;89 violating, failing or refusing to comply
with an order;' violating the New Source Performance Standards
or the National Emissions Standards for Hazardous Air Pollut-
ants;91 or violating any requirements regarding smelters, noncom-
80 33 U.S.C. § 1319(c)(3)(B)(ii) (1988).
81 Id. § 1311(f).
82 Heyat, supra note 33, at 505 (citing 33 U.S.C. § 1321 (a) (1) (1988) (defining "oil"
as including "oil of any kind or in any form")).
83 Id. (citing 33 U.S.C. § 1321(a)(14) (1988) (defining "hazardous substances" as
including only those substances found by EPA to "present an imminent and substantial
danger to public health or welfare")).
84 Id. (citing 40 C.F.R. §§ 110.3(a)-(b) (1990) (defining "harmful" quantities of oil
as discharges that "(a) [v]iolate applicable water quality standards, or (b) [c]ause a film
or sheen upon or discoloration of the surface of the water or adjoining shorelines or
cause a sludge or emulsion to be deposited beneath the surface of the water or upon
adjoining shorelines")). Heyatt also refers to United States v. Boyd, 491 F.2d 1163,
1168-69 (9th Cir. 1973) (sheen test upheld on grounds of administrative ease).
85 33 U.S.C. § 1318(a)(4)(B) (1988).
86 42 U.S.C. § 7401(b)(1) (1988).
87 Id. § 7409(a).
88 42 U.S.C. § 7410(a) (Supp. V 1993).
89 42 U.S.C. § 7413(c)(1)(A) (Supp. V 1993).
90 Id. § 7413(c)(1)(B).
91 Id. § 7413(c)(1)(C).
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pliance penalties or ozone." The offender could be fined up to
$25,000 per day of violation and imprisoned up to one year. Fines
and prison terms double for subsequent convictions. 3 Anyone
who knowingly falsifies a document required by the CAA or a
monitoring device may be fined up to $10,000 and imprisoned for
six months.'
The Clean Air Act Amendments of 1990 upgrade knowing
violations from misdemeanors to felonies, providing for fines pur-
suant to Title 18." Anyone who knowingly releases hazardous air
pollutants into the ambient air, knowing "at the time that he
thereby places another person in imminent danger of death or
serious bodily injury" commits a felony and "shall" be fined pursu-
ant to Title 18 and possibly imprisoned for up to fifteen years.
95
Any organization violating this provision "shall" be fined up to one
million dollars for each violation.
The statute does not require showing that the official "pur-
posely set out to commit the crime, only that the officer was
aware of its occurrence.""8  The government must show
"knowledge only of the emissions themselves, not knowledge of
the statute or of the hazards that emissions pose."" Yet the CAA,
like RCRA and the CWA,1° holds potential offenders account-
able for only "actual awareness or actual belief possessed,"' and
does not impute knowledge from one person to another.0 2
A defendant may escape liability by showing by a preponder-
ance of the evidence that the endangered person consented and
that the "danger and conduct were reasonably foreseeable hazards
of (i) an occupation, a business, or a profession; or (ii) medical
treatment or medical scientific experimentation conducted by
professionally approved methods and such other person had been
made aware of the risks involved prior to giving consent."
103
Anyone who negligently releases hazardous air pollutants into
92 Id. § 7413(c)(1)(D).
93 Id.
94 Id. § 7413(c) (2).
95 Id. § 7413(c)(1), (2), (3), (5).
96 Id. § 7413(c)(5)(A).
97 Id.
98 United States v. Little Rock Sewer Comm., 460 F. Supp. 6, 9 (E.D. Ark. 1978).
99 United States v. Buckley, 934 F.2d 84, 87 (6th Cir. 1991).
100 See supra notes 43-49 (RCRA), 76-80 (CWA) and accompanying text.
101 42 U.S.C. § 7413(c)(5)(B)(i) (Supp. V 1993).
102 Id. § 7413(c)(5)(B)(ii).
103 Id. § 7413(c) (5) (C).
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the ambient air, negligently "placing another person in imminent
danger of death or serious bodily injury shall" be fined pursuant
to Title 18 and possibly imprisoned for up to one year.1 The
statute also authorizes the administrator to pay any individual up
to $10,000 for providing information leading to a criminal con-
viction or judicial or administrative civil penalty for a CAA viola-
tion105
C. Other Statutes Used to Prosecute Environmental Offenders
In addition to the felony criminal penalty provisions in the
major environmental statutes, prosecutors have begun using other
traditional criminal statutes to prosecute environmental viola-
tors.'06 The primary reason behind this trend appears to be the
desire to secure greater fines and longer sentences.0 7
1. Conspiracy
Under 18 U.S.C. § 371, if two or more people conspire to
commit an offense against the United States or to defraud the
United States or its agencies and at least one of them acts to
accomplish the conspiracy's object, all conspirators may be fined
up to $10,000 and imprisoned up to five years even if the object is
104 Id. § 7413(c) (4).
105 Id. § 7413(0.
106 Eva M. Fromm, Commanding Respect: Criminal Sanctions for Environmental Cimes, 21
ST. MARY's LJ. 821, 848 (1990); Rakoff, supra note 4, at 225; see also Thornburgh, supra
note 26, at 777.
Apart from the amendments to existing laws, two other developments in the
mid-1980s further reflected the move toward recognizing criminal enforcement of environ-
mental laws as a national priority. First, Congress enacted the Criminal Fine Improve-
ments Act of 1987, which raised the level of criminal fines that may be imposed on an
organization from $100,000 to $200,000 per misdemeanor. Second, and perhaps more
significant, Congress passed the Sentencing Reform Act of 1984. Enacted as part of the
Comprehensive Crime Control Act of 1984, the Sentencing Reform Act directs the Unit-
ed States Sentencing Commission to establish policies and practices that eliminate unwar-
ranted disparity in sentencing while maintaining flexibility when appopriate.
White collar criminals, who often have no prior record and are 'first-time offend-
ers,' historically have been given probation. Conduct subject to sentencing under the new
sentencing guidelines has resulted in more serious consequences for first-time offenders.
Sentencing for environmental crimes reflects this trend toward tougher sanctions." Id.
(citing the Criminal Fine Improvements Act of 1987, Pub. L. No. 100-185, sec. 6, §
3571(c), 101 Stat. 1279, 1280 (codified at 18 U.S.C. § 3571(c) (1988)) and the Sentenc-
ing Reform Act of 1984, Pub. L. No. 98-473, §§ 211-239, 98 Star. 1837, 1987-2040 (codi-
fied as amended at 18 U.S.C. §§ 3551-3742 (1988), 28 U.S.C. §§ 991-998 (1988))).
107 Fromm, supra note 106, at 848.
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never achieved.' However, if the underlying offense is a mis-
demeanor, the punishment for the conspiracy cannot exceed the
maximum allowable for the misdemeanor. 1'9
Prosecutors have brought conspiracy charges when two or
more individuals have conspired to violate environmental laws. For
example, when two persons conspire to illegally dump hazardous
wastes, prosecutors may charge them with violating RCRA and with
conspiracy." ° Similarly, prosecutors may bring both charges
when, as in United States v. Import Certification Laboratories, Inc.,"'
three laboratory managers certified over a three year period that
nearly 8,000 imported vehicles met the emission standards under
the Clean Air Act, when in fact they did not. The managers pled
guilty to conspiracy to defraud the United States. In this case, the
penalties available under the conspiracy statute were far greater
than those listed in the Clean Air Act: five years imprisonment to
one year, respectively. 2
2. False Statements
Knowingly and willfully falsifying a material fact or making a
false representation "in any matter within the jurisdiction of any
department or agency of the United States" will result in a fine up
to $10,000 and possibly a prison term of five years."3 Because
most environmental statutes require filings and permits, environ-
mental defendants will often violate this statute."
4
For example, the defendants in Import Certification Laboratories
also pled guilty to making false statements."' Also, in United
States v. Pollution Control Industry of America,"6a hazardous waste
treatment company was fined $200,000 for telling a government
agency that it would dispose of benzene at a Texas facility, but
instead treated and disposed of it at its facilities in Indiana."7
108 18 U.S.C. § 371 (1988).
109 Id.
110 Fromm, supra note 106, at 848.
111 18 Env't Rep. (BNA) 1993 (C.D. Cal. Jan. 8, 1988).
112 Fromm, supra note 106, at 848.
113 18 U.S.C. § 1001 (1988).
114 See Rakoff, supra note 4, at 226.
115 Fromm, supra note 106, at 850 (citing Import Certiflcation Lab., 18 Env't Rep.
(BNA) at 1993). The president of the lab received a one year prison sentence without
parole, a $50,000 fine and five years probation. Id.




3. Mail and Wire Fraud
Any person using the mails,"' the wire or television"' to
defraud is subject to fines up to $1,000 and a five year prison
term. Anyone attempting to defraud a financial institution may be
fined up to one million dollars and imprisoned up to thirty
years. 2 ' This note will discuss cases involving mail and wire fraud
in section 5(b). 2
4. Aiding and Abetting
Anyone aiding and abetting the commission of an offense is
punishable as a principal.' To prove this offense, the govern-
ment must show that someone committed the underlying substan-
tive offense and that the defendant "'share[d] in the intent to
commit the offense ... [and] participated in some manner to
assist its commission. " " Prosecutors often use this statute to
charge corporate officers and employees who did not directly
commit the environmental offense in question.'24 For example,
in United States v. Hoflin, the Director of Public Works for the City
of Ocean Shores, Washington was convicted of aiding and abetting
the disposal of hazardous wastes in violation of RCRA and of 18
U.S.C. § 2 for telling a plant employee to bury drums of paint
waste at a sewage treatment plant."
5. Racketeering Influenced and Corrupt Organizations Act
(RICO)
(a) Overview of RICO.-In 1970, Congress passed the Organized
Crime Control Act, adding Chapter 96, entitled Racketeer Influ-
enced and Corrupt Organizations, to Title 18 of the United States
Code 26 in order "to seek the eradication of organized crime in
118 18 U.S.C. § 1341 (Supp. V 1993).
119 Id. § 1343.
120 Id. §§ 1341, 1343.
121 See infra notes 148-90 and accompanying text. The mail and wire fraud statutes
may be read together because they "share the same language." Carpenter v. United
States, 484 U.S. 19, 25 n.6 (1987).
122 18 U.S.C. § 2(b) (1988).
123 United States v. Self, 2 F.3d 1071, 1088-89 (10th Cir. 1993).
124 Rakoff, supra note 4, at 226.
125 880 F.2d 1033, 1034-35 (9th Cir. 1989), cert. denied, 493 U.S. 1083 (1990).
126 18 U.S.C. § 1961-68 (1988 & Supp. V 1993).
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the United States by strengthening the legal tools in the
evidence-gathering process, by establishing new penal prohibitions,
and by providing enhanced sanctions and new remedies to deal
with the unlawful activities of those engaged in organized
crime." "'
To that end, Congress made it unlawful (1) to use or invest
income gained from a pattern of racketeering activity or from
collecting unlawful debts in an enterprise that affects interstate
commerce; 2 ' or (2) to acquire or maintain an interest in or
control of an enterprise by engaging in a pattern of racketeering
activity or collecting unlawful debts;2 9 or (3) for anyone em-
ployed by or associated with an enterprise engaged in, or whose
activities affect, interstate commerce to participate, directly or
indirectly, in that enterprise through a pattern of racketeering
activity or collecting unlawful debts.' RICO also makes it a
crime to conspire to commit any of the above-mentioned offens-
es.1
3 1
RICO defines "enterprise" as "any individual, partnership,
corporation, association, or other legal entity, and any union or
127 United States v. Turkette, 452 U.S. 576, 589 (1981) (quoting statement of find-
ings prefacing the Organized Crime Control Act, 84 Stat. at 923). According to the state-
ment, Congress found
"that (1) organized crime in the United States is a highly sophisticated, diversi-
fied, and widespread activity that annually drains billions of dollars from
America's economy by unlawful conduct and the illegal use of force, fraud, and
corruption; (2) organized crime derives a major portion of its power through
money obtained from such illegal endeavors as syndicated gambling, loan
sharking, the theft and fencing of property, the importation and distribution of
narcotics and other dangerous drugs, and other forms of social exploitation; (3)
this money and power are increasingly used to infiltrate and corrupt legitimate
business and labor unions and to subvert and corrupt our democratic processes;
(4) organized crime activities in the United States weaken the stability of the
Nation's economic system, harm innocent investors and competing organizations,
interfere with free competition, seriously burden interstate and foreign com-
merce, threaten the domestic security, and undermine the general welfare of the
Nation and its citizens; and (5) organized crime continues to grow because of
defects in the evidence-gathering process of the law inhibiting the development
of the legally admissible evidence necessary to bring criminal and other sanctions
or remedies to bear on the unlawful activities of those engaged in organized
crime and because the sanctions and remedies available to the Government are
unnecessarily limited in scope and impact."
Turkette, 452 U.S. at 588 (quoting 84 Stat. 922-23).






group of individuals associated in fact although not a legal enti-
ty." ' 2 Legitimate and illegitimate enterprises are included in this
definition."' 3 While tife "major purpose of [RICO was] to address
the infiltration of legitimate business by organized crime," Con-
gress intended the statute to reach both legitimate and illegitimate
enterprises." Legitimate businesses "enjoy neither an inherent
capacity for criminal activity nor immunity from its consequenc-
es." 135
To insure that RICO is not read too narrowly, Congress in-
cluded a provision requiring the statute to be construed liberal-
ly1 6 "If RICO's language is plain, it controls; if its language,
syntax, or context is ambiguous, the construction that would 'ef-
fectuate its remedial purposes...by providing enhanced sanctions
and new remedies' is to be adopted."
3 7
The statute defines "pattern of racketeering activity" as "at
least two acts of racketeering activity, one of which occurred after
the effective date of this chapter and the last of which occurred
within ten years (excluding any period of imprisonment) after the
commission of a prior act of racketeering activity."' The Su-
preme Court in H. J. Inc. v. Northwestern Bell Telephone Co. crafted a
two-part test for determining if a pattern exists: "a plaintiff or
prosecutor must show that the racketeering predicates are related,
and that they amount to or pose a threat of continued criminal
activity."
13 9
In a paper presented to the judges of the D.C. and Second
Circuits, Professor G. Robert Blakey wrote that up to six questions
must be asked to determine if the facts of a particular case satisfy
this test:
(1) Are the acts in a series (at least two) related to one
another, for example, are they part of a single scheme?
(2) If not, are they related to an external organizing prin-
132 Id. §1961(4).
133 United States v. Turkette, 452 U.S. 576, 579 (1981).
134 G. Robert Blakey, The Racketeer Influenced Corrupt Organizations Act, 2 (Oct.
24-25, 1994) (unpublished manuscript, presented at workshop for judges of the D.C. and
Second Circuits, on file with the Notre Dame Law Review) [hereinafter Blakey paper]
(quoting HJ. Inc. v. Northwestern Bell Telephone Co., 492 U.S. 229, 244 (1988)).
135 Id.
136 18 U.S.C. § 904(a) (1988).
137 Blakey paper, supra note 134, at 3 (quoting 84 Stat. 923, 947 (1970)).
138 18 U.S.C. § 1961(5) (1988).
139 492 U.S. 229, 239 (1989).
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ciple, for example, to the affairs of the enterprise?
[If the answer to both questions is no, then the relationship
prong is not satisfied and the inquiry is over. If either is an-
swered yes, then up to three additional questions must be
asked:]
(3) Are the acts in the series open-ended, that is, do the
acts have no obvious termination point?
(4) If not, did the acts in the closed-ended series go on
for a substantial period of time, that is, more than a few weeks
or months?
[If either of these are answered yes, then continuity exists and
the plaintiff or prosecutor has satisfied the test. If the answer
to both is no, then up to two additional questions must be
asked:]
(5) May a threat of continuity be inferred from the char-
acter of the illegal enterprise?
(6) If not, may a threat of continuity be inferred because
the acts represent the regular way of doing business of a lawful
enterprise?
[If either of these questions are answered yes, then a threat of
continuity exists and the test is satisfied.]"'
Offenses which may constitute a pattern of racketeering activity
are termed "predicate offenses." The statute contains an exclusive
list of all predicate offenses. "'
RICO provides for criminal penalties and civil remedies. Crim-
inal penalties include fines, prison terms up to twenty years (or
life, if the punishment for the violation serving as a predicate
offense is life imprisonment) and mandatory forfeiture of: (1)
"any interest the person has acquired or maintained in violation of
section 1962;"112 (2)"any interest in, security of, claim against, or
property or contractual right of any kind affording a source of
influence over any enterprise which the person has established,
operated, controlled, conducted, or participated in the conduct of,
in violation of section 1962;"1" and (3) "any property constitut-
ing, or derived from, any proceeds which the person obtained,
directly or indirectly, from racketeering activity or unlawful debt
collection in violation of section 1962."" Also, the court may
140 Blakey paper, supra note 134, at 8-9.
141 18 U.S.C. § 1961(1) (Supp. V 1993).
142 18 U.S.C. § 1963(a)(1) (1988 & Supp. V 1993).
143 Id. § 1963(a)(2).
144 Id. § 1963(a)(3). Real and personal (both tangible and intangible) property are
forfeitable under this section. Id. § 1963(b). In addition, anyone taking right, title or in-
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fine a defendant who "derives profits or other proceeds from an
offense" up to twice the gross profits or proceeds."
Civil remedies include injunctions, treble damages and reason-
able attorneys' fees."' Modeled after the antitrust laws, civil RI-
CO creates "'a private enforcement mechanism that... deter[s]
violators and provide [s] -ample compensation to the victims.'" '14.
(b) Mail and Wire Fraud in Illegal Disposal of Hazardous
Wastes.-Environmental crimes are not listed as predicate offenses
under RICO,4 yet that has not prevented prosecutors and plain-
tiffs from using RICO to attack polluters and other environmental
violators. Instead they have relied upon mail and wire fraud, both
predicate offenses, to ihow a pattern of racketeering activity.149
Because "multiple mailings of correspondence between company
employees containing some environmental reports which include
untrue or false information could potentially result in a conviction
under RICO,""15 environmental offenses "may go hand-in-hand
with RICO charges."'
(i) Criminal Prosecutions.-RICO prosecutions of environ-
mental offenses usually involve the illegal disposal of solid or haz-
ardous wastes. In United States v. Paccione, the District Court for the
Southern District of New York ruled that "allegations of mail and
wire fraud are not invalidated as predicate acts because the alleged
enterprise is accused of violations of environmental laws as
well." The court convicted Angelo Paccione and Anthony
terest to the property from the violator after the violation has occured must show that
he or she is "a bona fide purchaser for value of such property who at the time of pur-
chase was reasonably without cause to believe that the property was subject to forfeiture
under this section." Id. § 1963(c).
145 Id. § 1963(a)(3).
146 18 U.S.C. § 1964 (1988).
147 Blakey paper, supra note 134, at 17-18, (quoting Blue Shield of Virginia v.
McCready, 457 U.S. 465, 472 (1982)).
148 See 18 U.S.C. § 1961(1) (Supp. V 1993).
149 See Heyat, supra note 33, at 488 (Demonstrating the use of mail and wire fraud
violations as grounds for RICO prosecutions discredits the argument that environmental
offenses cannot be predicate offenses for RICO. Also, RCRA does not preempt RICO.);
see also Elizabeth E. Mack, Another Weapon: The RICO Statute and the Prosecution of Environ-
mental Offenses, 45 Sw. L.J. 1145, 1151 n.40 (1991) ("Mail and wire fraud are the founda-
tion for liability for most environmental RICO cases."); Fromm, supra note 106, at 852.
(RICO is "an extremely attractive statute for use in the conviction of environmental
crimes.").
150 Fromm, supra note 106, at 852.
151 Mack, supra note 149, at 1159.
152 738 F. Supp. 691, 699 (S.D.N.Y. 1990) (denying defendants' motion for dismissal,
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Vulpis of mail fraud, racketeering and racketeering conspiracy
stemming from their operation of an illegal landfill. A codefen-
dant, John McDonald, was convicted of mail fraud.'53 According
to the court, Paccione and Vulpis perpetrated "one of the largest
and most serious frauds involving environmental crimes ever prose-
cuted in the United States. The amount of damage with respect to
monetary loss resulting from the fraud is literally off the Sentenc-
ing Guidelines' charts and is in the tens of millions of dollars.
The Guidelines contemplate fraud involving amounts up to
$5,000,000. However, a conservative estimate of the fraud here is
$35,000,000."1
4
In 1988, New York City raised its rates for disposing of waste
at its landfill from $9 to $18 a ton. Paccione and Vulpis procured
permits and licenses to collect, transport and dispose of solid and
hazardous waste by "intentionally [making] false statements to City
agencies claiming, among other things, that they intended to oper-
ate a clean fill grading operation on certain land in Staten Is-
land." '155 They instead dumped thousands of tons of garbage, in-
cluding asbestos, on land in Staten Island near a residential
area.1
56
The court convicted Paccione and McDonald of mail fraud
for making fraudulent statements to the New York State Depart-
ment of Environmental Conservation. For example, the two de-
fendants said that McDonald owned New York Environmental
Contractors, a New York corporation which was also a defendant,
and that they, the defendants, had permission to deliver medical
waste to a Pennsylvania incinerator. Paccione and McDonald then
suppression and severance). "Nothing in the decisions of this Circuit suggests that mail
or wire fraud, properly alleged, in the conduct of an enterprise cannot be included as
racketeering activity because the enterprise is alleged to have engaged in violations of
regulatory schemes which do not constitute racketeering activity on their own . .. .Con-
trary to defendants' contention, the existence of environmental regulatory schemes, in-
cluding criminal penalties, does not somehow 'preempt' the use of properly stated allega-
tions of mail fraud as racketeering activity in charging a violation of RICO because viola-
tions of that environmental regulatory schemes are also implicated. The indictment in
this case is not merely an instance of the Government using the mail fraud staute, and
thereby RICO, to add counts 'in an indictment the gravemen of which was the violation
of other federal criminal statutes.'" Id. (quoting United States v. Mangan, 575 F.2d 32, 49
(2d Cir. 1978), cert. denied, 439 U.S. 931 (1978)).
153 United States v. Paccione, 751 F. Supp. 368 (S.D.N.Y. 1990), aff'd 949 F.2d 1183
(2d Cir. 1991), cert. denied, 112 S. Ct. 3029 (1992).
154 Id. at 371.




defrauded doctors and hospitals by charging them the rates re-
quired to lawfully dispose of the medical waste, and then dumping
it illegally on the Staten Island property.
In sentencing Paccione and Vulpis, the court took pains to
note that fraud, not the environmental violations, was the underly-
ing RICO activity."' 7 It recognized that "a court cannot sentence
a defendant for uncharged and unrelated conduct;" ' here, the
environmental violations. Yet it found "a very strong nexus be-
tween the fraud and the environmental damage."'59 In fact, in
applying the sentencing guidelines for racketeering, the court
added four points because both defendants played "leadership
roles in the dumping of illegal and toxic substances.""6 The RI-
CO guidelines applied "because the environmental offense came
under the rubric of the fraud offense which in turn came under
the rubric of the RICO offense."1
61
In United States v. Case, a New Jersey district court convicted
Herbert Case of conspiracy to commit mail fraud and of mail
fraud stemming from his illegal dumping of hazardous waste.
62
Case told hazardous waste generators that he would dispose of the
waste legally, then dumped it into Hudson Bay through Passaic
Valley's sewage system and into an unauthorized landfill. To con-
ceal this scheme, he submitted false reports and manifests to the
New Jersey Department of Environmental Protection (NJDEP) and
sent fake invoices to the generators, charging them for legally dis-
posing of the waste."
After being convicted, Case moved for relief, relying on the
Supreme Court's holding in McNally v. United States that "[t]he
mail fraud statute clearly protects property rights, but does not
refer to the intangible right of the citizenry to good govern-
ment."' 6 Case argued that, after McNally, the mail fraud statute
protected only intangible and tangible property rights and that,
since submitting false information to state agencies did not de-
prive those agencies of any property or money, the mail fraud
157 Id. at 374.
158 Id. at 375 (relying on United States v. Barone, 913 F.2d 46 (2d Cir. 1990) and
United States v. McCall, 915 F.2d 811 (2d Cir. 1990)).
159 Id.
160 Id. at 376.
161 Id. at 376 n.6.
162 684 F. Supp. 109 (D.NJ. 1988), aftld, 866 F.2d 1413 (3d Cir. 1988).
163 Id. at 110.
164 McNally v. United States, 483 U.S. 350, 356 (1987).
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statute does not protect against this type of scheme."
The court said that the defendant's use of Passaic Valley facili-
ties and procurement of a permit-both of which were obtained
fraudulently-constitute a loss to Passaic Valley and to the NJDEP.
The court was not "convinced" that the mail fraud statute would
not protect against this type of loss, but stated that it did not
need to decide this issue to uphold the convictions."6 Since the
jury convicted Case of a scheme to defraud Passaic Valley, NJDEP
and the generators, who suffered a monetary loss in being de-
frauded, the court found that, at the very least, Case conspired "to
obtain contracts and money from the generators of hazardous
waste" and so was guilty of mail fraud. 67
In United States v. Self,' Steven Self was convicted of violat-
ing RCRA, mail fraud, conspiracy to violate RCRA, the Clean Air
Act and the Clean Water Act. On appeal, the Tenth Circuit said
the evidence did not support convictions for violating RCRA and
for mail fraud because the government had not proven that the
waste in question was "hazardous" under RCRA. Since the govern-
ment had charged that Self planned to defraud the Southern Cal-
ifornia Gas Company (SCGC) of money by contracting to legally
dispose of a "hazardous waste," here, natural gas condensate, but
instead transported it to a gas station, mixed it with gas and sold
it, the government also had to show that the condensate was a
hazardous waste. Since it failed to show this, the evidence support-
ing the mail fraud count was "insufficient as a matter of law."69
Despite the failure on these particular facts, the case still shows
how mail fraud and environmental violations may work closely
together.
Two states have also used racketeering counts to prosecute for
environmental violations. In Commonwealth v. Lavelle,7' the State
of Pennsylvania charged William Lavelle, W.A. Lavelle and Son Co.
and Lavco, Inc. with violating the corrupt organizations provisions
of the Pennsylvania Crimes Code. Lavelle told generators of solid
and liquid waste that he would dispose of the waste legally, then
165 Case, 684 F. Supp. at 113-14.
166 Id. at 114.
167 Id. at 115.
168 2 F.3d 1071 (10th Cir. 1993).
169 Id. at 1084.
170 16 Envtl. L. Rep. 20497 (Pa. Ct. C.P. Lackawanna Cty. 1985), af['d 555 A.2d 218
(Pa. Super. Ct. 1989), appeal denied, 568 A.2d 1246 (Pa. 1989) (no written opinion) (dis-
cussing 18 PA. CONS. STAT. ANN. § 911 (Supp. 1994)).
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"systematically dumped or disposed . .. [the waste] at the Morgan
Highway landfill or poured [it] down a mine borehole located at
the office address of both companies then in existence. '7 Nei-
ther site was approved and neither Lavelle nor the site owner had
a permit to dispose of the industiial waste. 7 ' The court convict-
ed Lavelle and the two corporations of committing "hundreds of
thefts by deception."'73
More recently, the Appellate Division of the Superior Court of
New Jersey found two dirt brokers, a dumper, a truck company
and three public officials among others guilty of racketeering,
conspiring to commit racketeering, bribery, theft of services, falsify-
ing and tampering with public records, forgery and unlawful en-
gagement in the business of solid waste collection and dispos-
al. 74 In New Jersey v. Bal4 the court found that these defendants
"conspired to illegally dump solid waste generated in New York in
several New Jersey sites."" Specifically, Richard Bassi and Mi-
chael Harvan found illegal dump sites in North Bergen and other
places in North Jersey, contacted New York waste haulers like
Patrick Ball and Big Apple Leasing, Ball's company, and arranged
for them to dispose of their solid waste at the unlawful sites. The
public official defendants accepted bribes in exchange for granting
permits and facilitating the illegal dumping.Y
Holding that the New Jersey legislature intended its racketeer-
ing statute to be even broader than the federal RICO statute,177
the court found that an enterprise exists when a "group of people
associate together in order to provide and operate illegal dumping
sites in New Jersey for out-of-state waste." 7' The statute defines
171 Id.
172 Id.
173 Id. The statute lists "thefts and related offenses" as predicate offenses. It does not
list environmental violations. 18 PA. CONS. STAT. ANN. § 911(h)(i) (Supp. 1994).
174 State v. Ball, 632 A.2d 1222 (N.J. Sup. Ct. 1993), cert. granted sub nom. State v.
Bassi, 639 A.2d 304 (NJ. 1994) (no written opinion). The court's holding was adopted in
Maxim Sewerage Corp. v. Monmouth Ridings, 640 A.2d 1216 (N.J. Sup. Ct. 1993) (civil
RICO action brought by sewage utility against developer alleging common-law fraud, fed-
eral RICO violations, breach of contract and of statutory duties).
175 Ball 632 A.2d at 1226-27.
176 Id. at 1227.
177 Id. at 1240.
178 Id. at 1239. Some of the differences between the New Jersey and the federal
statutes that the court cites are: (1) unlike the federal RICO statute, New Jersey's statute
(1) specifically includes "illicit as well as licit enterprises;" (2) "expressly defines what
constitutes a 'pattern of racketeering activity;'" (3) includes a statutory presumption
"which makes it easier to trace funds from a specific source into an investment;" and (4)
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enterprise as including "any individual, sole proprietorship, part-
nership, corporation, business or charitable trust, association, or
other legal entity, any union or group of individuals associated in
fact although not a legal entity, and it includes illicit as well as
licit enterprises and governmental as well as other entities."179 Ac-
cording to the court, "all that is required to satisfy the New Jersey
RICO enterprise element is a group of people, however loosely
associated, whose existence provides the common purpose of com-
mitting two or more predicate acts." ' The predicate acts for the
state RICO conspiracy were bribery, money laundering, forging
waste origin forms at the Hackensack Meadowlands Development
Commission (HMDC) baler, and theft of services from the HMDC
baler.'"'
(ii) Civil Suits.-Plaintiffs have used RICO to gain federal
.provides more specificity and clarity respecting the proscribed conduct and counters the
.constitutional vagueness' argument often leveled against Federal RICO." Id. at 1240.
The New Jersey racketeering statute defines "pattern of racketeering activity" to
require:
(1) Engaging in at least two incidents of racketeering conduct one of which
shall have occurred after the effective date of this act and the last of which
shall have occurred within 10 years ... after a prior incident of racketeering
activity; and
(2) A showing that the incidents of racketeering activity embrace criminal con-
duct that has either the same or similar purposes, results, participants or victims
or methods of commission or are otherwise interrelated by distinguishing charac-
teristics and are not isolated incidents.
N.J. STAT. ANN. § 2C:41-1d (West Supp. 1994).
179 N. J. Stat. Ann. § 2C:41-1c (West Supp. 1994).
180 Balk 632 A.2d at 1240.
181 Id. at 1249. The statute does not, however, list environmental violations as predi-
cate offenses. See N.J. STAT. ANN. § 2C:41-la (West 1994). Other states have enacted
some form of RICO (statutory sections listed define prohibited activities). See ARIZ. REV.
STAT. ANN. § 13-2312 (1994); CAL. PENAL CODE § 186.2 (West 1995) (criminal profiteer-
ing statute); COLO. REv. STAT. ANN. § 18-17-104 (West 1994); CONN. GEN. STAT. § 53-395
(1994); DEL. CODE ANN., tit. 11, § 1503 (1994); FLA. STAT. ANN. § 895.03 (West 1995);
GA. CODE ANN. § 16-14-4 (Michie 1994); HAW. REV. STAT. § 842-2 (Michie 1994); IDAHO
CODE § 18-7804 (Michie 1994); IND. CODE ANN. § 35-45-6-2 (West 1994); LA. REV. STAT.
ANN. § 15:1353 (West 1994); MINN. STAT. ANN. § 609.903 (West 1995); MIss. CODE ANN.
§ 97-4-5 (1993); NEV. REv. STAT. ANN. § 207.400 (Michie 1993); N.M. STAT. ANN. §
30-42-4 (1994); N.Y. PENAL LAW § 460.20 (McKinney 1995) (enterprise corruption stat-
ute); N.C. GEN. STAT. § 75D-4 (1994); N.D. CENT. CODE § 12.1-06.1-03 (1994); OHIO REV.
CODE ANN. § 2923.31 (Anderson 1994); OKLA. STAT. ANN., tit. 22, § 1403 (West 1995);
OR. REV. STAT. ANN. § 166.720 (1993); 18 PA. CONS. STAT. ANN. § 911 (1994); RI.GEN.
LAws, § 7-15-2 (1994); TENN. CODE ANN. § 39-12-204 (1994); UTAH CODE ANN. §




jurisdiction, and to use the statute's treble damages provision to
"leverage favorable settlements. " ' In accordance with this,
plaintiffs have used mail and wire fraud to bring actions under
RICO for environmental violations. Plaintiffs have often had diffi-
culty pleading a RICO cause of action with sufficient particulari-
ty," or establishing a causal link between the mail fraud and
the harm suffered from the environmental violation,"s or show-
ing a pattern of racketeeringss or proving a threat of continu-
ing activity,'" or properly alleging participation, or trying to
hold a municipality liable." However, these are largely pleading
182 Mack, supra note 149, at 1145. State courts now have concurrent jurisdiction. Id.
at n.5 (citing Tafflin v. Levitt, 493 U.S. 455 (1990)).
183 See Chartrand v. Chrysler Corp., 785 F. Supp. 666, 669 (E.D. Mich. 1992)
(Plaintiffs given extension to amend civil RICO count in complaint to include added
details.); Bernfield v. Chester Valley Disposal, Co., 1988 WL 25283, *1 (E.D. Pa. 1988)
("This complaint does not meet the test of a 'short and plain statement of the claim
showing that the pleader is entitled to relief' set forth in Fed.R.Civ.P. 8(a). Its allegations
instead amount to legal conclusions reiterated.").
184 See Brittingham v. Mobil, 943 F.2d 297, 305 (3d Cir. 1991) ("Plaintiffs have nei-
ther alleged nor demonstrated a connection with the use or investment of racketeering
income other than the normal reinvestment of corporate profits."); Mish v. Richter, 1990
WL 120650, *2 (E.D. Mich. 1990) ("Defendants' environmental misdemeanors and alleged
mail fraud . . . may have resulted in an inability to obtain drilling permits for plaintiff's
land, but this does not establish an enterprise engaged in a pattern of racketeering activ-
ity as required by RICO .... Defendants' environmental violations and their dealings
with the MDNR [Michigan Department of Natural Resources] are separate and distin-
guishable from defendants' alleged breach of their contract with plaintiffs.").
185 See Huntsman-Christensen Corp. v. Mountain Fuel Supply Co., 1986 WL 15400, *9
(D. Utah 1986) (evidence supports only one episode of mail/wire fraud).
186 See Brossman Sales, Inc. v. Broderick, 808 F. Supp. 1209 (E.D. Pa. 1992) ("Plain-
tiff Brossman Sales has failed to allege a threat of defendants' racketeering activities con-
tinuing beyond the date the property was sold. Plaintiff has alleged that the environmen-
tal violations continue to exist and that defendants refuse to remedy them, but these
alleged wrongdoings are not the predicate acts which constitute defendants' alleged racke-
teering activity. Plaintiff accused defendants of three predicate racketeering acts: mail
fraud, wire fraud and bank fraud. These acts are completed, and while defendants' con-
tinuing acts may be wrongful, they do not constitute predicate crimes under RICO.");
PMC, Inc. v. Ferro Corp., 131 F.R.D. 184, 188 (C.D. Cal. 1990) (Plaintiffs "assertion that
evidence of fraudulent transactions not connected with the sale of the Productol plant is
relevant to proving a 'continuing threat' for its RICO claims is unpersuasive.").
187 See Genty v. Resolution Trust Corp., 937 F.2d 899, 915-16 (3d Cir. 1991) (" .
plaintiffs adduced at trial no direct evidence or circumstantial evidence that these defen-
dants 'wilfully participated in the [fraudulent] scheme with the intent that its illicit objec-
tives be achieved,' . . . as is required to establish a federal mail fraud violation."); Stan-
dard Equipment, Inc. v. Boeing Co., 1985 WL 70, *7 (W.D. Wash. 1985) (court dismissed
one of plaintiffs three RICO claims for failing to allege that defendant participated in
the fraudulent scheme).
188 See Albanese v. City Fed. Sav. & Loan Ass'n, 710 F. Supp. 563, 568 (D.N.J. 1989)
("Because the Township is a municipality, it cannot form the requisite mental state to
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and evidentiary problems. They do not pose any inherent difficulty
in using the mail and wire fraud as predicate offenses to bring
suits arising out of environmental violations under RICO. 89
III. RICO As A TOOL TO FIGHT ILLEGAL DISPOSAL
OF HAZARDOUS WASTE
Prosecutors took the first step towards prosecuting environ-
mental violations as predicate offenses under RICO when they
used mail and wire fraud as surrogates for the actual substantive
environmental violations. However, it is not enough to stop here.
In the cases previously mentioned, it is reasonable to assume that
the prosecutors and plaintiffs did not bring those actions because
of the mail or wire fraud per se. The environmental damage
caused was the primary concern.
Relying on mail and wire fraud to invoke RICO is risky be-
cause the polluter may not have committed any acts of mail or
wire fraud. Also, as previously mentioned,9 ' the Supreme Court's
holding in McNally limiting the mail and wire fraud statutes solely
to deprivations of property as opposed to intangible rights such as
the right to honest services poses problems for using those statutes
to prosecute individuals for fraudulently obtaining a state permit
to operate a waste disposal site. Although the Court subsequently
narrowed McNally's holding in Carpenter v. United States,9' many
of the circuits have limited the government's property interest in
various permits and licenses not yet issued. 9 '
commit an act of racketeering activity, and it is therefore incapable of violating 18 U.S.C.
§ 1962(a), (c), and (d), and cannot be liable under RICO's civil liability provision, 18
U.S.C. § 1964(c).").
189 See generally Southwest Marine, Inc. v. Triple A Mach. Shop, Inc., 720 F. Supp.
805 (N.D. Cal. 1989); Prudential Ins. Co. of America v. United States Gypsum, 711 F.
Supp. 1244 (D.N.J. 1989) (in which plaintiffs successfully pursued civil RICO claims aris-
ing from environmental offenses using mail and wire fraud).
190 See supra notes 164-67 and accompanying text.
191 484 U.S. 19, 25 (1987) ("McNally does not limit the scope of § 1341 to tangible
as distinguished from intangible rights.").
192 See, e.g., United States v. Granberry, 908 F.2d 278, 280 (8th Cir. 1990) (school
bus operator permit not property under mail or wire fraud statutes), cert. denied, 500 U.S.
921 (1991); United States v. Kato, 878 F.2d 267, 268-69 (9th Cir. 1989) (federal pilot
licenses not property before government issues them); Toulabi v. United States, 875 F.2d
122, 125 (7th Cir. 1989) (taxi driver's license not property before issued by government);
United States v. Murphy, 836 F.2d 248, 254 (6th Cir. 1988) (certificate of registration to
operate bingo games not property before issued), cert. denied, 488 U.S. 924 (1988); Mylan
Lab., Inc. v. Akzo, N.V., 770 F. Supp. 1053, 1072-73 (D. Md. 1991) (FDA has no proper-
ty interest in its approvals of new drug applications within meaning of wire and mail
fraud statutes). But see United States v. Martinez, 905 F.2d 709, 713-15 (3d Cir. 1990)
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The Second Circuit, for example, in United States v. Schwartz,
held that a permit to export goods was not property within the
meaning of the wire and mail fraud statutes.'93 A license not yet
issued "does not constitute property in the hands of the govern-
ment for federal fraud statute purposes."'94 Just because the gov-
ernment has the "power to regulate does not a fortiori endow it
with a property interest in the license; that is the mere issuance of
a document designed to formalize the government's regulation
does not thereby create a property interest for the govern-
ment."195
In United States v. Sacco,'96 the Second Circuit disagreed with
the analysis in Schwartz, saying that the government had a property
interest in permits to operate waste dump sites. Yet it still reversed
the defendant's convictions for mail and wire fraud because it felt
"bound" by Schwartz.9
While Congress in 1988 amended the definition of "scheme
or artifice to defraud" to include the deprivation of the intangible
right of honest services,"8 thereby superseding McNally, prosecu-
tors seeking to use instances of alleged fraud occurring prior to
the amendment as predicate offenses under RICO could run into
court decisions like those just mentioned. As a result, relying on
the mail and wire fraud statutes may not always bring environmen-
tal violations under RICO. Therefore, it makes sense to do directly
what the courts are already allowing prosecutors and plaintiffs to
do indirectly: prosecute environmental crimes under RICO.
Listing environmental violations as predicate offenses under
RICO is not a new idea. In 1990, Professor G. Robert Blakey rec-
ommended adding offenses under RCRA and a state hazardous
waste program to RICO." Professor Blakey relied in part on a
similar recommendation passed by the National Association of
(statute-issued license to practice medicine issued is property), cert. denied, 498 U.S. 1017
(1990).
193 924 F.2d 410, 416-18 (2d Cir. 1991).
194 Id. at 417.
195 Id.
196 923 F.2d 970, 973-75 (2d Cir.), reh'g, 927 F.2d 726 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 500 U.S.
919 (1991).
197 Id. at 973.
198 18 U.S.C. § 1346 (1988).
199 G. Robert Blakey, An Analysis of the Myths That Bolster Efforts to Rewrite RICO and
the Various Proposals for Reform: Mother of God-Is This the End of RICO?, 43 VAND. L. REV.
851, 927 n.210 (1990). Yet he cautioned that RICO should be used only for substantial,
not technical, violations. Id. at 927.
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Attorneys General (NAAG), which was also cited by Michigan
Representative John Conyers in a speech on the floor of the
House of Representatives on August 7, 1987.2" The NAAG pro-
posed amending the list of RICO predicates in the following man-
ner:
Any act which is indictable under section 3008 of the
federal Resource Conservation and Recovery Act ('RCRA'), 42
U.S.C. sec. 6928 (1984), or any act which is chargeable as a
crime under a similar provision of a state hazardous waste
program authorized by the administrator of the Environmental
Protection Agency, pursuant to section 3006 of RCRA, 42
U.S.C. sec. 6926 (1984).21
The NAAG explained that its resolution would "add knowing
violation of hazardous waste management and disposal laws to the
list of RICO 'predicate offenses,' two (2) violations of which trig-
ger application of the RICO statute's deterrent civil and criminal
sanctions."2 °2 The NAAG based its decision on the increasing
cost-difference between legal and illegal disposal of hazardous
waste, which provides a "growing impetus for corrupt individuals
and organizations to seek illicit gain by inducing legitimate busi-
nesses, through fraud, or misrepresentation, to utilize the 'lower
cost' hazardous waste disposal 'services' offered by the corrupt
individuals or organizations; 2 1° on RICO's being "the principal
and most-effective piece of federal legislation aimed at deterring
such illegal enterprises and diverting from corrupt organizations
such illicit proceeds;"214 on the fact that "many state 'RICO' and
organized crime control acts incorporate by reference the list of
predicate offenses recited in the federal RICO Act ... thereby
enabling a single change in the federal Act to achieve maximum
beneficial effect by directly enabling states to apply their own
resources, processes and sanctions to such criminal enterprises
while at the same time enabling federal enforcement resources to
200 "Mob Involvement in Hazardous Waste Disposal: Why We Need a Strong RICO,"
Aug. 7, 1987. 134 Cong. Rec. H6788 (daily ed. Aug. 10 1988) [hereinafter "Mob Involve-
ment"].
201 Resolution III, passed during the Spring Meeting of the National Association of







be effectively applied against such criminal enterprises;" 5 and
on the realization that "the absence of a specific provision in
federal RICO aimed at criminal enterprises in the hazardous waste
management and disposal areas makes application of the RICO
statute's provisions and sanctions to hazardous waste-related crimes
more difficult and uncertain, thereby reducing and/or eliminating
the significant deterrent potential of the statute and exposing our
nation's citizens and natural resources to endangerments which
would otherwise be prevented or deterred."2"6 Adding a RCRA
violation as predicate offense instead of violations of all major
environmental statutes makes sense and is a good first step since
RCRA "is the primary source of criminal environmental prosecu-
tions to date."
20 7
If environmental offenses were listed as predicate offenses,
they would probably either involve an association in fact 28 or a
legitimate business operated through a pattern of racketeering
activity. Prosecution under all four subsections of §1962 would be
possible. For example, a hauler of hazardous waste who has re-
ceived income from transporting and disposing of the waste with-
out a permit would violate § 1962(a) by investing that income in a
legitimate business affecting interstate commerce, i.e. a disposal
facility.2' RICO's §1962(b) is usually used in scenarios where a
gang is trying to collect protection money from a storekeeper and
instead takes a one-third ownership interest in the store in ex-
change for the money owed. It might apply in the environmental
context where a hauler learns the business for which he works is
handling hazardous waste without filing the appropriate documen-
tation, in violation of § 6928(d) (4) of RCRA.2 1' Not disclosing
this information or falsifying reports to conceal it in exchange for
an interest in the company would probably violate § 1962(b) of
RICO.
211
However, most prosecutions would probably be brought under
205 Id.
206 Id.
207 Rakoff, supra note 4, at 220. For example, in 1989, 71% of all criminal enforce-
ment cases in the environmental field involved violations of either RCRA or the Clean
Water Act. Adler, supra note 15, at 797-98.
208 18 U.S.C. § 1961(4) (1988).
209 Id. §1962(a) (violation of 42 U.S.C. § 6928(d)(2)(1988)).
210 42 U.S.C. § 6928(d)(4).
211 18 U.S.C. § 1962(b) (1988).
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§ 1962(c).12 For example, operating a disposal facility handling
hazardous waste from different states without a permit would now
violate not only RCRA, but RICO too.2t3 Finally, a § 1962(d)
charge could be added for conspiring to violate any of these three
subsections of RICO.1 4
A. Disadvantages of Environmental Statutes in Fighting Illegal Disposal
1. Reliance on Self-auditing and Voluntary Disclosure
(a) Only Non-intentional Polluters Likely to Audit and Report.-One
of the problems in relying on the environmental statutes is their
dependence upon self-auditing over investigation and upon com-
pliance over enforcement. As the NAAG recognized, the rising
costs for legal disposal encourages some people to dump illegally
(and less costly). Only by increasing the available criminal and
civil sanctions for dumping illegally will the government be able to
stop this tide.
212 Id. § 1962(c).
213 Id. (violation of 42 U.S.C. § 6928(d)(2)(1988)). While RICO would extend crimi-
nal liability further than RCRA would, the Supreme Court has limited liability under §
1962(c) to those who participate in "the operation or management of the enterprise it-
self." Reves v. Ernst & Young, 113 S. Ct. 1163, 1172 (1993).
To be liable, the participant does not have to be primarily reponsible for the enter-
prise, nor even be an employee. Id. Even "lower-rung participants . . . under the direc-
tion of upper management" may be liable if they "exert control" over the enterprise. Id.
at 1173. However, the Court declined to decide "how far § 1962(c) extends down the
ladder of operation." Id.
Subsequent court decisions have tried to define liability under § 1962(c), agreeing
that a person may be liable without managing or operating the enterprise or sharing in
its profits. United States v. Oreto, 37 F.3d 739, 750 (1st Cir. 1994); United States v. Vio-
la, 35 F.3d 37, 41 (2d Cir. 1994); United States v. Thai, 29 F.3d 785, 816 (2d Cir. 1994),
cert. denied sub nom. Tran v. United States, 115 S. Ct. 456 (1994), and by Do v. United
States, 115 S. Ct. 496 (1994).Yet the participation must be "willful and knowing." Viola,
35 F.3d at 41. See also United States v. Wong, 1994 WL 617584, *24-25 (2d Cir. 1994)
(distinguished itself from Reves, in which the accountant was not aware of the surround-
ing criminal activities, and found gang members liable under § 1962(c) because they
were "thoroughly indoctrinated participants in the criminal activities" of the gang). Merely
taking directions and performing tasks "necessary and helpful" to the enterprise might
not be sufficient to trigger liability. Viola, 35 F.3d at 41. See also Oreto, 37 F.3d at 750
("one may 'take part in' the conduct of an enterprise by knowingly implementing deci-
sions, as well as by making them"); University of Maryland at Baltimore v. Peat, Marwick,
Main & Co., 996 F.2d 1534, 1539 (3d Cir. 1992) (providing financial services and attend-
ing board meetings not sufficient to trigger liability under § 1962(c)). The Third Circuit
in Peat, Manoick went even farther than the other circuits in saying that "[s]imply be-
cause one provides goods or services that ultimately benefit the enterprise does not mean
that one becomes liable under RICO as a result. There must be a nexus between the
person and the conduct in the affairs of an enterprise." Id.
214 18 U.S.C. § 1962(d) (1988).
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The emphasis on compliance rather than enforcement began
in the early 1980's during Anne Burford'5 administration. From
1980 to 1981, the number of cases referred from the EPA's Office
of Enforcement to the Justice Department declined 69 percent, 82
percent in RCRA and Superfund cases.1 5 In delegating enforce-
ment to the states, the EPA's "chief goal" had been encouraging
compliance through self-auditing and governmental inspection. 6
In a speech before a January 1991 conference of federal en-
forcement officials, former Assistant Attorney General Richard
Stewart remarked that "the system only works if voluntary compli-
ance is the norm. 21 7 Since most polluters "are not bank robbers
or drug dealers, but legitimate business enterprises" the govern-
ment should tailor its enforcement to encourage self-auditing and
voluntary disclosure.1 8 In 1991, Judson Starr and Nancy Voisin
contended that a program in which voluntary disclosure would
mitigate punishment would reduce investigative costs and quicken
how fast remedial measures could begin. Companies would be
persuaded to report themselves because disclosure would cost less
than the potential civil and criminal penalties.1 9
Yet this only works for the unintentional polluter; the person
or corporation who makes a mistake, realizes it and tries to find
the least costly method of remedying the error. It does not work
for those who choose to violate environmental laws in order to cut
costs and increase profits. The intentional polluters are doing so
because it is less costly and more profitable than complying with
the environmental laws. They have no reason to report honestly.
As Representative Conyers said in endorsing the NAAG's recom-
mendation: "Voluntary compliance-particularly by the mob-is
not likely to occur. Truly legitimate businesses may be expected to
follow the law. The problem is that all too often the businesses in
this area are far from legitimate."220
(b) Lower Costs of illegal Disposal (Incentive Not to Re-
port).-Whether dealing with organized crime or with businessmen
taking advantage of criminal opportunities, self-auditing is not a
215 REBOVICH, supra note 5, at 8-9.
216 Id. at 9.
217 Judson W. Starr & Nancy Voisin, Toward an Environmental Voluntary Disclosure Pro-
gram, 16 CoLUM. J. ENVT. L. 333, 336 (1991).
218 Id.
219 Id.
220 "Mob Involvement," supra note 200, at H6789.
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sufficient safeguard because of the drastically rising cost difference
between legal and illegal disposal. "The truth is that the cost of
legitimate hazardous waste disposal has risen steadily since the
1940s and has been seen as a deciding factor for corporations
choosing to dispose illegally."22' The cost of legal treatment of
hazardous waste can range from $15 to $550 per 55 gallon drum,
depending on the chemical. Pharmaceutical companies average
$125 per drum for legal disposal.22 Midnight dumping is the
cheapest form of illegal disposal: "all that is required is 'a truck
and a lack of regard for public safety.' 2 3 Therefore, the costs of
complying with the various environmental regulations coupled with
the emphasis on self-policing encourages polluting. At the very
least, they are not sufficient deterrents. More aggressive investiga-
tion and stricter sanctions are needed to fight pollution. RICO
would provide both.
2. Who is Dumping Illegally?
While most illegal dumping involves individual enterprises,
organized crime may also be involved in this area, especially in the
New Jersey-New York region.2 24 According to Rep. Conyers, the
mob, with its traditional involvement in garbage disposal and oper-
ating landfills, was particularly well-suited to move into hazardous
waste disposal. 5 Michigan Representative John Dingell agreed,
calling organized crime's link to illegal dumping of toxic substanc-
es a "continuing threat to undermine the Government's efforts to
resolve the national problem of hazardous waste disposal through
the Resource and Conservation and Recovery Act."
2 6
According to Representative Conyers, garbage haulers connect-
ed to organized crime easily obtained the permits necessary to
dispose of the waste. 27 Yet in addition to a license for the haul-
221 REBOVICH, supra note 5, at 3.
222 Id.
223 Id.
224 Id. at 59. In his study, Mr. Rebovich found no cases of mob involvement in the
other states he surveyed: Maine, Maryland and Pennsylvania. Id. at 64.
225 "Mob Involvement," supra note 200, at H6789.
226 Statement of Representative John Dingell, Chairman of Subcommittee on
Oversight and Investigation of the Committee on Energy and Commerce on Thursday,
May 28, 1981, p.1. Lt. Col. Justine Dintino, New Jersey State Police, agreed with Rep.
Dingell in testimony before the same subcommittee. Id. at 5.
227 "Mob Involvement," supra note 200, at H6789 (referring to Organized Crime and
Hazardous Waste Disposed: House Subcomittee on Oversight and Investigations of the
Committee on Interstate and Foreign Commerce, 92 Cong. 2 Sess. 22 (Dec. 16, 1980)).
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ers, RCRA required a landfill operator to sign the manifest, stating
that the waste has been properly disposed of. Organized crime
already owned many landfills, which subsequently began accepting
"dubious shipments of hazardous waste thinly disguised as ordinari-
ly municipal waste."228 They also bribed or threatened other sites
to sign the manifest for waste never received or shipped elsewhere
and began establishing false disposal and treatment centers.2
The phony disposers would then store it on site or dump it some-
where, like on a roadway, down a sewer or in the ocean.2 °
On the other hand, other commentators argue that organized
crime plays at best a limited role in the illegal disposal of hazard-
ous waste. According to a study of hazardous waste dumping in
four states, "most commonly, the criminal dumper is an ordinary,
profit-motivated businessman who operates in a business where
syndicate crime activity may be present but by no means
pervasive."231 One commentator has stated that
the average hazardous waste offender has more in common
with the Ivan Boesky ideal than with that of Don Corleone.
The average dumper appears to be an entrepreneur who starts
out by running a safe and legal business. But harsh competi-
tion, lax enforcement, and ample opportunities to go astray
tempt our would-be tycoon into becoming a real-life crimi-
nal.
2




231 REBOVICH, supra note 5, at xiv.
232 Id. at 59.
The usual form of organized hazardous waste criminal behavior in the sample
was a loosely knit, independent criminal unit based on the triadic nature of the
legitimate hazardous waste disposal processing cycle (generator, hauler, and treat-
er). Early criminal offenses grew from simple, individualized offenses, such as
midnight dumping, that were eventually prone to failure as a result of en-
forcement advancements, and rose to a point where small detection-avoidance
enterprises were formed.
Id. at 60-61.
According to Mr. Rebovich, organized crime would have a difficult time crossing
over from garbage hauling to disposing of hazardous waste because it cannot control'the
"Corporate America" which generates the waste and can dispose of it anywhere (woods,
sewers, etc.). Since access to disposal sites is not limited, anyone willing to break the law
is able to dispose of hazardous waste. Id. at 67-68.
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disposing of hazardous wastes, the same issue remains: illegal dis-
posal costs so much less and is so much more profitable than
legal disposal that "[a]ttainment of full compliance by the Govern-
ment by traditional forms of civil and criminal suits is not likely to
happen in the foreseeable future." 3 Even "[i]f more severe
criminal penalties were available under these laws, we would still
have the problem of limited investigative and prosecutorial re-
sources."234 RICO "may offer a promise of an avenue to deal
with the aggravated violations of our hazardous waste statutes."2 5
B. Advantages of RICO
1. Greater Criminal and Civil Sanctions
First, the increased criminal and civil sanctions available under
RICO 6 should raise the costs of illegally disposing of hazardous
waste to the point where compliance makes financial sense. For
example, a generator of medical waste may think twice before
paying a hauler to dump the waste down a sewer. In fact, genera-
tors may investigate potential haulers and disposal facilities to
make sure that they are not exposing themselves to criminal liabil-
ity under RICO by contracting with these parties.
Besides the increased criminal and civil sanctions, the advan-
tage of prosecuting under RICO is the increased statute of limita-
tions and the more lax joinder rules.3 7
2. Longer Statute of Limitations
Because RICO does not expressly include a statute of limita-
tions, courts look to the five year limit in 18 U.S.C. § 3 2 8 2 ," a
"catchall" federal criminal statute of limitations.2 9 This means
233 "Mob Involvement," supra note 200, at H6789.
234 Id.
235 Id.
236 See supra notes 142-47 and accompanying text.
237 Paul E. Coffey, The Selection, Analysis, and Approval of Federal RICO Prosecutions, 65
NOTRE DAME L. REV. 1035, 1040 (1990) (If RICO's elements are satisfied, "the 'normal'
rules of joinder and computation of the statute of limitations do not apply.").
238 "Except as othenvise expressly provided by law, no person shall be prosecuted,
tried or punished for any offense, not capital, unless the indictment is found or the
information is instituted within five years next after such offense shall have been commit-
ted." 18 U.S.C. § 3282 (1988).
239 Agency Holding Corp. v. Malley-Duff & Associates, Inc., 483 U.S. 143, 155 (1987);




that the government must bring a prosecution within five years
after the defendant has committed a predicate offense. While
some courts have applied the "last predicate act" rule, starting the
limitations period running as soon as the last predicate act occurs,
the majority position is that the period is tolled until the govern-
ment, or in civil cases, the plaintiff, learns of the pattem of racke-
teering activity." Since the other predicate act only has to have
occurred within ten years of the last predicate act,24 the prose-
cution therefore may reach crimes committed more than fifteen
years previously: first predicate act plus ten years; then second act,
then if using majority rule wait until pattem is discovered, then
five year statute of limitations. In addition, the limitations period
for a RICO conspiracy does not begin to run until the object of
the conspiracy is accomplished or forsaken.242
This is much longer than the five year statutory period cur-
rently invoked for RCRA,243 which does not include the ten year
connection between criminal acts. As a result, prosecuting RCRA
violations under RICO would allow the government to gather
together a greater number of criminal acts extending backwards
over a longer period of time.
3. Facilitates Joinder
Under Rule 8 of the Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure, the
government may join in one indictment any offenses "of the same
or similar character" or "based on the same act or transaction" or
a series of acts and transactions "constituting parts of a common
scheme or plan"2' and any defendants who "are alleged to have
participated in the same act or transaction or in the same series
of acts or transactions constituting an offense or offenses."245
240 Bontkowski v. First Nat'l Bank of Cicero, 998 F.2d 459 (7th Cir. 1993), cert. de-
nied, 114 S. Ct. 602 (1993); McCool v. Strata Oil Co., 972 F.2d 1452 (7th Cir. 1992).
241 18 U.S.C. § 1961(5) (1988); Coffey, supra note 237, at 1041 n.27.
242 United States v. Eisen, 974 F.2d 246, 263 (2d Cir. 1992).
243 Courts routinely invoke the five year period of 28 U.S.C. § 2462 in cases involv-
ing RCRA because the statute, like CWA and CAA (prior to the 1990 amendments), does
not have a statute of limitations. Teresa A. Holderer, Enforcement of 7SCA and the Federal
Fwe Year Statute of Limitations for Penalty Actions, 91 MICH. L. REv. 1023, 1059 n.75 (1993).
See also Adam Babich, RCRA Imminent Hazard Authority: A Powerful Tool for Businesses, Gov-
ernments, and Citizen Enforcers, C883 ALI-ABA 81, 112 (Feb. 17, 1994) ("five year statute of
limitations of 28 U.S.C. § 2462 probably applies to citizen RCRA imminent hazard ac-
tions").
244 FED. R. CRiM. P. 8(a) (1994).
245 Id. 8(b).
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This has proven troublesome in the environmental context be-
cause of the many players involved, performing different, often
unrelated acts. The government also has had a difficult time prov-
ing that the individuals knew of the other participants. As Mr.
Rebovich wrote, quoting a yard worker involved in illegally dis-
posing of hazardous waste:
Unless prosecutors are successful in shutting down opera-
tions, the prosecution of core group individuals and their man-
agers can ultimately be fruitless. 'If one of the guys who dumps
gets into trouble with the law . .. somebody else will be picked
or hired to take his place .... Even if one of the supervisors
gets caught, there will be someone else at work or they have
enough connections with people outside of work to bringing in
the 'right' person to get the job done .... Unless the place is
shut down, somebody will find a way-maybe a little different
way-to get the job done.'
For the hazardous waste crime enforcement community,
nullifying the illegal actions of individual criminal managers
may, indeed, amount to a shallow enforcement gesture. Once
firmly established ... workplace subcultures seemingly could
easily survive without the services of- those managers removed
from the criminal mainstream of prosecution."'
RICO is tailor-made for just such a task. As the General Ac-
counting Office concluded after studying federal organized crime
prosecutions:
Prior to the passage of [RICO], attacking an organized
criminal group was an awkward affair. RICO facilitates the
prosecution of a criminal group involved in superficially unre-
lated criminal ventures and enterprises connected only at the
usually well-insulated upper levels of the organization's bureau-
cracy ....
Before the Act, the government's efforts were necessarily
piece-meal, attacking isolated segments of the organization as
they engaged in single criminal acts. The leaders, when caught,
were only penalized for what seemed to be unimportant
crimes. The larger meaning of these crimes was lost because
the big picture could not be presented in a single criminal
prosecution. With the passage of RICO, the entire picture of
the organization's criminal behavior and the involvement of its
leaders in directing that behavior could be captured and pre-
sented. 47
246 REBOVICH, supra note 5, at 57.
247 Blakey paper, supra note 134, at 19-20 (quoting General Accounting Office, Effec-
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RICO makes it easier to join the various offenses and defen-
dants, creating a substantive offense which links "these diverse par-
ties and crimes"248 to an enterprise.249 If the acts involved are
predicate offenses under RICO, they "by definition, are related to
the affairs of the enterprise. " "° The enterprise concept is the
tiveness of the Government's Attack on La Cosa Nostra (April 14, 1988)).
248 United States v. Elliott, 571 F.2d 880, 902 (5th Cir. 1978), cert. denied, 439 U.S.
953 (1978). See generally Thomas S. O'Neill, Note, Functions of the RICO Enterprise Concept,
64 NoTRE DAME L. REv. 646 (1989) (discussion of enterprise's role in facilitating joinder
of offenses and defendants).
249 Enterprise is defined as "any individual, partnership, corporation, association, or
other legal entity, and any union or group of individuals as in fact although not a legal
entity". 18 U.S.C. § 1961(4). Also, compare the following subsections of § 1962 (emphasis
added):
(a) It shall be unlawful for any person who has received any income de-
rived, directly or indirectly, from a pattern of racketeering activity . . .in which
such person has participated ... to use or invest, directly or ihdirectly, any part
of such income, or the proceeds of such income, in acquisition of any interest
in, or the establishment or operation of, any enterprise which is engaged in, or
the activities of which affect, interstate or foreign commerce ....
(b) It shall be unlawful for any person through a pattern of racketeering
activity ... to acquire or maintain, directly or indirectly, any interest in or con-
trol of any enterprise which is engaged in, or the activities of which affect inter-
state or foreign commerce.
(c) It shall be unlawful for any person employed by or associated with any
enterprise engaged in, or the activities of which affect, interstate or foreign com-
merce, to conduct or participate, directly or indirectly, in the conduct of such
enterprise's affairs through a pattern of racketeering activity or the collection of
unlawful debt.
18 U.S.C. § 1962 (emphasis added).
250 O'Neill, supra note 248, at 691 (quoting United States v. Thevis, 474 F. Supp.
117, 130 (N.D. Ga. 1979), afid, 665 F.2d 616 (5th Cir. 1982), cert. denied, 456 U.S. 1008
(1982)). See generally Prakash Himatlal Mehta, Project: Twenty-Third Annual Review of
Criminal Procedure: United States Supreme Court and Courts of Appeals 1992-1993, 82 GEO. LJ.
844, 860 n.1009 (1994) (citing United States v. Zannino, 895 F.2d 1, 16 (1st Cir. 1990)
(joinder of two counts of illegal gambling and one count of making extortionate loan
proper when offenses alleged to be predicate acts in furtherance of RICO conspiracy,
even though defendant not charged with RICO conspiracy, because part of common
scheme), cert. denied, 494 U.S. 1082 (1990), habeas corpus denied, 1994 WL 707131 (1994));
United States v. Balzano, 916 F.2d 1273, 1280 (7th Cir. 1990) (joinder of witness intimi-
dation count with extortion and RICO conspiracy counts proper because witness intimi-
dation intended to prevent testimony concerning other counts and therefore "part and
parcel of the same criminal scheme"); see also Mehta, supra, at 860 n.1014 (citing United
States v. Alvarez, 860 F.2d 801, 824 (7th Cir. 1988) (joinder of offense for sale of co-
caine with narcotics conspiracy and RICO offenses proper, even though sale of cocaine
unrelated to charges against all but one of 11 defendants, because CCE charge against
that defendant "'arose out of the same overall scheme' of narcotics violations that were
alleged throughout the indictment" (quoting United States v. Holzer, 840 F.2d 1343, 1350
(7th Cir. 1988), cert. denied, 486 U.S. 1035 (1988))), cert. denied, 493 U.S. 829 (1989)); see
also Mehta, supra, at 860 n.1016 (citing United States v. DiNome, 954 F.2d 839, 843-44
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key, "work[ing] in RICO as a joinder mechanism that expands the
number of people who may be considered related."2"'
In United States v. Castellano, the court "clarified the notion
that a 1962(c) claim may in fact circumscribe the requirements of
Rule 8(b) by 'loosening the statutory requirements for what consti-
tutes joint criminal activity. "'252 Just alleging a RICO conspiracy
"presumptively satisfies Rule 8(b), since the allegation implies that
the defendants named have engaged in the same series of acts or
transactions constituting an offense. "zs The court explained that
having a substantive RICO count and a RICO conspiracy count
"further broadens the government's power to charge multiple
defendants together." ' RICO also has a spillover effect, permit-
ting joinder of defendants not charged with RICO if the defen-
dant "is alleged to have participated in the same series of acts or
transactions that constituted the conspiracy or RICO offense, de-
spite the fact that his participation may have been too limited to
permit his being included as a co-conspirator or co-racketeer."255
RICO's effect may be clearly seen in the conspiracy area.s 6
(2d Cir. 1992) (joinder of defendants in single RICO conspiracy count permissible even
though defendants did not participate in charged acts of codefendants involving deadly
force because all defendants' criminal activities tended to prove existence of RICO enter-
prise and pattern of racketeering activity by each), cert. denied, 113 S. Ct. 95 (1992));
United States v. Eufrasio, 935 F.2d 553, 566-67 (3d Cir. 1991) (joinder of codefendants
and racketeering, RICO, and extortion offenses proper even though one of three defen-
dants also charged with murder conspiracy; "all criminal acts charged against each defen-
dant, including the murder conspiracy, were undertaken in furtherance of single, com-
monly charged racketeering enterprise" and, therefore, "consistent with law of joinder in
RICO cases"), cert. denied, 112 S. Ct. 340 (1991); United States v. Caporale, 806 F.2d
1487, 1509-10 (11th Cir. 1986) (joinder of defendants in single RICO conspiracy count
permissible even though defendants charged with different acts of racketeering in differ-
ent parts of the country when acts charged furthered overarching RICO conspiracy to
receive kickbacks from insurance or health care service representatives), cert. denied, 483
U.S. 1021 (1987).
251 O'Neill, supra note 248, at 680. "Enterprise again plays the critical role. The con-
cept unites what otherwise would be wholly separate offenses committed by the same
defendant or defendants." Id. at 688.
252 Id. at 682 (quoting United States v. Castellano, 610 F. Supp. 1359, 1396 (S.D.N.Y.
1985)).
253 Castellano, 610 F. Supp. at 1396.
254 Id.
255 Id. at 1396-97.
256 United States v. Elliot, 571 F.2d 880 (5th Cir. 1978), cert. denied, 439 U.S. 953
(1978) is the "standard for joinder of defendants in a RICO conspiracy case." O'Neil,
supra note 248, at 684.
The 'enterprise conspiracy' is a legislative innovation in the realm of individual
liability for group crime . . . . The substantive proscriptions of the RICO statute
apply to insiders and outsiders-those merely 'associated with' an enterprise-who
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By "creating a substantive offense which ties together. diverse
parties and crimes," RICO eliminates the problem of finding a
single agreement or common objective. 7 By committing an act
listed as a predicate offense, each individual agrees to participate,
directly or indirectly, in the enterprise."5 It does not matter that
each defendant performed different and even unrelated acts, "so
long as we may reasonably infer that each crime was intended to
further the enterprise's affairs. " "
In United States v. Elliot, the Fifth Circuit was "convinced that,
through RICO, Congress intended to authorize the single prose-
cution of a multi-faceted, diversified conspiracy by replacing the
inadequate 'wheel' and 'chain' rationales with a new statutory
concept: the enterprise."2" By linking the various defendants and
offenses into an enterprise, RICO "has displaced many of the legal
precepts traditionally applied to concerted criminal activity," free-
ing the prosecution from "the strictures of the multiple conspiracy
doctrine," and allowing "the joint trial of many persons accused of
diversified crimes."261
4. Avoiding Severance
Not only does RICO facilitate joinder of defendants and
counts under Rule 8, but helps avoid severance under Rule 14.
Even if defendants and counts are properly joined under Rule 8,
defendants may ask the court to sever if the joinder causes preju-
dice.2  The court will often find prejudice if (1) the defendants'
defenses are mutually antagonistic or exclusive,63 (2) a codefen-
dant refuses to give testimony exculpating the movant defendant
participate directly and indirectly in the enterprise's affairs through a pattern of
racketeering activity .... Thus, the RICO net is woven tightly to trap even the
smallest fish, those peripherally involved with the enterprise. This effect is en-
hanced by principles of conspiracy law also developed- to facilitate prosecution of
conspirators at all levels.
Id. at 684 n.165 (quoting Elliot, 571 F.2d at 903).
257 Elliot 571 F.2d at 902.
258 Id. at 902-03. "Thus the object of a RICO conspiracy is to violate a substantive
RICO provision here, to conduct or participate in the affairs of an enterprise through a
pattern of racketeering activity and not merely to commit each of the predicate crimes
necessary to demonstrate a pattern of racketeering activity." Id. at 902.
259 Id. at 902-03.
260 Id. at 902.
261 Id. at 899.
262 FED. R. CPiM. P. 14 (1994).
263 See Zafiro v. United States, 113 S. Ct. 933 (1993).
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in order to avoid self-incrimination, or (3) using a codefendant's
extra judicial confession against that codefendant still incriminates
the movant defendant.2" Courts will often not find prejudice
when evidence used in a joint trial would have been admissible
against the movant defendant in a separate trial or if the evidence
was easily compartmentalized into the individual defendants and
offenses.6 5
The compartmentalization of evidence will depend upon the
facts of each specific case. However, in general, RICO increases
the amount of evidence that can be introduced against each de-
fendant for each count, thereby reducing the likelihood of a court
finding prejudice. By connecting different defendants and offenses
into a pattern of racketeering activity involving an enterprise, RI-
CO expands the amount of evidence that would be admissible in
separate trials for the individual crimes and parties. Since the
offenses and defendants are connected, evidence regarding all of
them is relevant to each of them in proving the substantive RICO
count. For example, in United States v. DiNome, the Second Circuit
said that evidence of "numerous crimes, including the routine
resort to vicious and deadly force to eliminate human obstacles,
was relevant to the charges against each defendant because it
tended to prove the existence and nature of the RICO
enterprise." 66 The court found that the evidence would have
been admissible "even if the defendants had been accorded in-
dividual trials"267 because it "may reveal the threat of continued
racketeering activity and thereby help to establish that the
defendant's own acts constitute a pattern within the meaning of
RICO."
268
One last concern is that the combination of RICO and RCRA
might prove too complex for most juries. While calling RICO "an
interesting alternative method of prosecution," Dennis Vacco, U.S.
Attorney for the Western District of New York said the technical
and complex nature of RICO and of the environmental statutes
"might prove to be-as a practical matter-too complicated for
the average jury, at this time."'26" However, Vacco acknowledged
264 Mehta, supra note 250, at 851-53.
265 United States v. DiNome, 954 F.2d 839, 844 (2d Cir. 1992), cert. denied, 113 S. Ct.
95 (1992).
266 Id. at 843; Drew v. United States, 331 F.2d 85 (D.C. Cir. 1964).
267 DiNome, 954 F.2d at 844.
268 Id. at 843.
269 Dennis C. Vacco, Government's Reponse to Compliance in Environmental Matters in the
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that RICO will probably be increasingly used for environmental
violations as the regulations and statutes become more "common
place."27 Since RICO and RCRA have been used in criminal and
civil cases for roughly two decades, courts and juries are probably
familiar enough with the statutes to use the two together. In fact,
juries have already demonstrated their familiarity with the two stat-
utes by using them in the mail and wire fraud context.
IV. CONCLUSION
The illegal disposal of hazardous waste has been characterized
as "one long game of hot potato. The idea is to make as much
profit as you can by being the temporary possessor of the hot
potato before unloading it on some other person, organization, or
place. In the end, the final recipient is the loser."27' If the illegal
dumping of hazardous wastes continues at its current pace, we will
all be the losers. As former Attorney General Dick Thornburgh
wrote:
As a government and as a people we must remain vigilant; as
legal defenders of our land, water, and air, we must investigate,
prosecute, and convict polluters; as individuals we must never
again say 'so what' to environmental crime .... Our long-term
goal, therefore, must be to continue to set an even higher
standard of protecting our environment from criminal depreda-
tion.272
Today, RICO is the "prosecutor's tool of choice against sophis-
ticated forms of crime."273 It is time we allowed prosecutors to
use that tool to stop the illegal dumping of hazardous wastes on
our land and in our streams, rivers and oceans. It is time to add
violations of RCRA and of comparable state statutes as predicate
offenses to RICO.
Brendan P. Rielly*
Western District of New YorA C496 ALI-ABA 41, 44 (Apr. 19, 1990).
270 Id. at 45.
271 REBOVICH, supra note 5, at 125.
272 Thornburgh, supra note 26, at 780.
273 Blakey paper, supra note 134, at 18.
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